Halfway through transitional period, peace remains elusive

The second of two 18-month transitional periods has just begun in Burundi. In a long awaited ceremony, witnessed by leaders and dignitaries from all over Africa, presidential powers were transferred from a Tutsi to a Hutu. The questions are: How much was achieved in the first 18 months? And what is the new president, Domitien Ndayizeye, expected to achieve in his 18 months in power? So far, the most crucial elements of Burundi's peace process - ceasefire agreements signed between the government and armed rebel groups - remain unimplemented on the ground. Commentators noted with optimism that the transfer of power was a real step forward, and a sign that promises were beginning to be kept in the Burundian context. The 30 April handover marked the mid-point of the implementation of the Arusha Accord that was signed in 2000, the country's roadmap to peace that was facilitated by former South African president, Nelson Mandela. The date was also symbolic as, for the first time since the 1993 assassination of Burundi's first democratically elected president, Melchior Ndadaye - the event that sparked the decade long civil war - a member of the Hutu majority was ruling Burundi. However, other commentators complained that 30 April merely marked a superficial alteration and little would change for most Burundians, as the political process was moving far faster than the reality on the ground. During Pierre Buyoya's 18-month tenure as president of the transitional government, peace continued to elude Burundi, and the war between the Hutu rebel factions and the government forces intensified. Agathon Rwasa's Forces nationales de liberation (FNL) is yet to enter into ceasefire negotiations with the transitional government, and a 3 December 2002 ceasefire signed between Pierre Nkurunziza's Conseil national pour la defense de la democratie-Forces pour la defense de la democratie (CNDD-FDD) and the government has not held. Amid the continued fighting, civilians continued to suffer at the hands of all the parties involved in the conflict; social infrastructure collapsed, humanitarian agencies struggled to deliver relief and, Burundians said, the country had never been poorer. Little change with political transition

President Domitien Ndayizeye, who was sworn in on 30 April to lead Burundi’s second 18-month transitional period

Aside from changes at the head, the transfer brought little structural change to the political scene in Burundi. President Ndayizeye made only minor changes to the cabinet that had served under Buyoya, introducing three new ministers from pro-Hutu rebel groups to take part in the next stage of the transitional process. These new additions to the cabinet were Gaspard Kobako, a senior member of the CNDD-FDD faction led by Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye, who was appointed minister for public works and equipment; Cyrille Hicintuka, from the Forces nationales de liberation (FNL-PALIPEHUTU) faction led by Alain Mugabarabona, minister for civil service; and Rodolphe Baranyizigiye, from the Front pour la liberation nationale (FROLINA) rebel group led by Joseph Karumba, who was appointed minister for youth, sports and culture. This left Agathon Rwasa's FNL and Pierre Nkurunziza's CNDD-FDD still outside the framework of the transitional government for Ndayizeye's 18-month term. FNL still seems a long way from joining the peace process, but in an effort to iron out issues not finalised in the 3 December ceasefire agreement negotiations with Nkurunziza have continued. Reasons for continued fighting However, following the FDD's bombardment of Bujumbura in the lead-up to the 30 April handover, and the subsequent successful transfer of power, pressure mounted on CNDD-FDD to clarify its political position. Many analysts saw the continuation of the war, despite the December ceasefire, as a result of wrangling for positions in the transitional government. "The problem that remains is political," a regional analyst who requested anonymity told IRIN. "CNDD-FDD is not prepared to integrate into the existing political framework. They want a new constitution so they can start again from a new agreement." The analyst added, "They are going for very high positions - maybe even the vice-presidency." There was some concern over the 28 March agreement, signed between Buyoya and Ndayizeye to confirm the transfer of presidency, which some observers said left Ndayizeye with his hands tied and saw him devolve the main thrust of negotiating with the rebels to his vice-president, on the grounds that it would be easier for a Tutsi to negotiate with Hutu rebels. However, in the brief period since he has been in office, Ndayizeye himself has taken the lead and actively rekindled negotiations, travelling regionally and repeatedly telling the CNDD-FDD that the door is open for them to participate in national institutions. But Nkurunziza has made it clear that, unlike Ndayikengurukiye's CNDD-FDD faction and Mugarabona's FNL, his group is not prepared to enter into the transitional government just yet. Nkurunziza argues that the lack of implementation of the 3 December ceasefire agreement, and the need to renegotiate the make-up of the transitional government, makes his group's entry into government institutions impossible. "This accord was signed between two belligerents who are the transitional government and the CNDD-FDD movement and these two belligerents have to be treated equally," Nkurunziza told IRIN recently. "If arrangements must be made in the composition of the transitional government, they should be negotiated," he said. "It is out of the question that we adhere to the transitional government. The issue here is to negotiate together the composition of a responsible transitional government," he added. In the weeks following the change of president, it emerged that another regional summit would be called, most probably in the Tanzanian commercial capital, Dar es Salaam, and the CNDD-FDD would get the negotiations they wanted. Pressure has also mounted on Rwasa's FNL, the only remaining pro-Hutu movement yet to sign a ceasefire with the government, to at least enter into negotiations with the government. In a statement issued on 30 April, the UN Security Council warned the FNL that sympathy for the movement was scarce. "The FNL's unwillingness to date to seek a peaceful resolution of this conflict makes it difficult for the international community to accept the legitimacy of its concerns," it said. The government's position was somewhat stronger, and in the 28 March agreement, Ndayizeye vowed to sideline FNL and impose sanctions "if the group continued its policy of violence". However, Ndayizeye neither specified the sanctions nor how he intended to go about them. This is a threat that has been used before, albeit without success, but the consensus was that if Nkurunziza's CNDD-FDD joined the process, Rwasa would be left with little room for manoeuvre and would also be forced to sign up. However, according to FNL spokesman Pasteur Habonimana, because they were not signatories to the Arusha accord, they were not part of the peace process; therefore, negotiations with a Hutu president "are impossible" and the only possible course for dialogue would be in the ethnic context, with a Tutsi. "We will talk with the vice-president, but only if he comes as a Tutsi and not as the vice-president," Habonimana said. While believing that the change of presidents had been symbolic, many Burundians said that, as political wrangling continued and deals were made and broken daily, they continued to feel increasingly separated from those in charge. Jan van Eck, an analyst who follows the Burundi process closely, agreed. "There is a disconnection between the population and the peace process," he said. "The process is like a train that is trying to meet all the deadlines. The locomotive is moving on, regardless of the situation on the ground, and other elements are being left behind." Other critics argued that while South Africa was breathing life into the process, some aspects of its approach were not suitable to the Burundian context. They said that South Africa "oversimplified" the Burundian problem, and was trying to address it in the same way that it addressed apartheid. Meanwhile, politicians within the government said that there had been significant collaboration between Tutsis and Hutus, and that progress had been made in changing the political mindset on ethnicity. They also felt that the strategy adopted by the ruling party, the Front pour la democratie au Burundi (FRODEBU), to join the transitional government - within the framework of the Arusha accord - was realistic and sustainable, whereas the rebels who have remained in the hills would soon be a spent force. "If the rebellion doesn't come to the table, it will be crushed," a FRODEBU member said. "If this change really brings even more progress, then the rebellion will have lost its raison d'etre." However, sceptics suggested that the political class, whether Tutsi or Hutu, was in collusion and the change in mindset would only accentuate the difference between those within and those outside the process. "Now they [Hutu politicians] have had a taste of power, they are protecting each other, Eugene Nindorera, a former Burundian minister for human rights, told IRIN. "There are so many divisions, that it can't merely be put down to the simple Tutsi-Hutu split. It is a war of a different nature." Nindorera said that Burundians were waiting for a leader who would deliver peace and govern according to the wishes of the people, rather than for personal interests. "We will judge the change on what he [Ndayizeye] delivers. If he brings peace and kicks the bad people out - whether Hutu or Tutsi - people will understand and respect him for it," he said. "However, the reality is that there is a lack of confidence between the parties. This is not only within the context of the ceasefire negotiations, but also within the government itself." In his speech at the inauguration, Mandela put the burden of change on Burundi's political class, urging them to put the good of Burundians before their own personal interests - something many Burundians outside the process agreed had not been done.

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BURUNDI: Chronology of political and security situation in 2003
Major political players in Burundi