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In Brazil’s Amazonian state of Pará, families live in fragile wooden homes beside potholed dirt tracks, just metres from deep copper mines that have multiplied in the scramble to supply the global energy transition.“It’s a future that never arrives,” one miner explained – a bitter refrain in a region promised prosperity by the clean energy boom.
This is the same state that will host the UN climate summit, COP30, in November. Leaders will gather in Belém to speak of “just transitions”. But the “green economy” here looks much like the old fossil fuel-based one: concentrated profits, displaced communities, polluted rivers. Some of these operations have been linked to slave labour and environmental violations.
The situation in Pará reflects a much broader issue. Governments are racing to secure lithium, copper, manganese, rare earths, and other minerals – the building blocks of clean energy – spurred on by geopolitical rivalry, tariff wars, and supply chain fears. China’s growing dominance and surging demand have triggered a wave of industrial policy and extraction. But in the rush to secure supply, the questions of who benefits and who bears the costs are too often ignored.
Research released by Global Witness last year on the link between mining for transition minerals and violence showed that while over 90% of incidents of violence associated with mining took place in developing countries, between 70-80% of these mines were owned by companies in China and the Global North – where the profits also flow.
This unequal distribution of harms and benefits fuels resentments in resource-rich countries of the Global South. It also accelerates governance breakdown, heightens the threat of protest and litigation, and makes supply chains riskier – imperilling the energy transition needed to tackle climate change.
And this is not the only risk multiplier associated with irresponsible mining. Many new and prospective projects lie under fragile ecosystems that are essential for carbon sequestration. This loss is rarely accounted for, and when combined with mining’s already high carbon footprint, raises an uncomfortable question: Are so-called green minerals repeating fossil fuel-era harms? And in a world struggling with multiple overlapping and entrenched crises, could they cause more problems than they solve?
Different countries, same story
In Myanmar, two thirds of the world's supply of the rare earth elements terbium and dysprosium are being mined to power the permanent magnets that turn the engines of electric vehicles. In a country wracked by civil war and recovering from a major earthquake disaster, unregulated mining for these elements has caused widespread ecosystem destruction, social issues, and poisoned the earth. Global Witness research showed farmers have lost their jobs and are forced into poorly regulated mining work that for many results in the loss of their lives.
The diverse geographies of minerals mean there are countless examples of conflict and negotiation. Residents in Zimbabwe’s lithium-rich regions, such as Masvingo province, have more hope for the potential economic prosperity the scramble for their minerals might provide. However, in recent years, lithium extraction projects have been plagued by accusations of land displacement, water degradation, and poor working conditions, with top jobs being outsourced to Chinese nationals by the Chinese-owned companies that control the majority of the lithium mines in the country.
Copper and manganese reserves are touted as central to the global energy transition because of their importance to making solar power and batteries. And yet, in Brazil’s COP30 host state of Pará, enforcement officials describe a system in which undeclared ore from mid-scale artisanal and industrial-scale mines is laundered into formal supply chains through corrupt licensing and ports. Starlink internet and Brazil’s instant payment system, PIX, now allow illegal operators to coordinate in remote areas, evade raids in real time, and rapidly move money out of reach. Even when authorities do intervene, complicity among political and security actors means sites often reopen within days.
Finding a way forward
In many Western capitals, harmful extraction is still framed as a technical challenge – a supply chain issue fixable through corporate Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) frameworks, due diligence laws, and voluntary certification schemes. These are important tools, but they rest on a flawed assumption: that governance is weak or absent, and that oversight alone can fix it.
In reality, governance already exists – it is just embedded in political and economic systems that are shaped by unequal power, rather than equity. From Brazil to Serbia to Indonesia, regulations are entangled with informal influence, elite capture, and deep-rooted marginalisation. These systems extract value from local communities by design. What’s described as fragility is often a system working as intended – externalising harm, concentrating wealth.
The extractive models of the past, which concentrated harm locally while exporting profits, must no longer be tolerated – and that means changing the story as well as the rules.
Unless the weak rules around who creates, retains, and benefits from the economic value generated by mineral extraction – and the political power that comes with it – are confronted head-on, the minerals rush will deepen inequality and further destabilise regions already under strain. Without local value addition – such as processing, refining, job creation, and reinvestment in public goods – alongside transparency and accountability, critical minerals extraction risks fuelling the very instability that climate action professes to resolve.
The good news is that civil society groups and representatives from resource-rich countries are beginning to look at how to anchor the energy transition in justice and responsible practice, creating the necessary conditions for it to succeed.
An essential starting point is ensuring that the benefits and value generated from transition minerals are fairly shared with the countries and communities that host them. The extractive models of the past, which concentrated harm locally while exporting profits, must no longer be tolerated – and that means changing the story as well as the rules. If justice and equity are absent from the dominant narrative about transition minerals, they will be absent from the governance frameworks that shape them.
Doing this means committing to good governance, strong regulations, supply chain transparency, and capacity development to equip countries with the tools needed to enforce standards and protect rights. Crucially, resource-rich nations must be free to control their resources and make deals as they see fit, without the constraints found within controversial ISDS agreements and WTO judgements.
Environmental, social, and climate impact assessments should be non-negotiable so that projects being greenlit don’t risk worsening the very crises they seek to help resolve.
Towards a global regime
This year will see crucial flashpoints where governments could steer towards a global governance regime for responsible mining. Shortly after the 8-10 September Africa Climate Summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the G7 is expected to meet in Chicago to deliver a roadmap based on an earlier action plan – this seems to be a first step towards recognising that simply sourcing these minerals as cheaply as possible is unsustainable.
This is against a background of signs from the US suggesting a return to transactional geopolitics, with critical minerals used as bargaining chips in foreign policy deals – including proposals by Trump-aligned figures linking extraction to peace negotiations in places like Ukraine and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This risks embedding extraction into geopolitical deals without accountability, transparency, or benefit for communities on the ground.
The G20, chaired by South Africa, is lending its weight to considering the questions of benefits to the community, and industrial strategies rooted in justice.
Closing out the year, we will see the world’s climate negotiators gather at COP30 in Belém. Brazil has the chance to give substance to the Just Transition Work Program, and broker international agreement around the fair and just pathways for mineral extraction and use.
We believe these summits are a once-in-a-generation opportunity to decide whether the energy transition will correct the injustices of the fossil fuel ages, or replicate them in new form.
As leaders gather in Addis Ababa, Chicago, Belém, and Johannesburg, they will speak of a “just transition”. But in Brazil and beyond, the rules of extraction still serve those with the most power, not those who live with its consequences. Unless the governance of transition minerals is re-written to centre equity and accountability, the green economy will undoubtedly deliver the same old future – only faster.
