Upon renewing their work permits this summer, many Syrian refugees in Jordan encountered something unexpected: a massive bill. Unlike the past eight years, when they typically paid no more than 10 Jordanian dinars (approximately $14), starting in July they were told to pay just over 500 dinars ($700) for a year-long permit, in addition to much higher monthly social insurance contributions than before.
These new fees, modelled on how much the country charges migrant workers for permits, represent an insurmountable obstacle for the overwhelming majority of the nearly 630,000 registered Syrian refugees in Jordan. They also represent something deeper: the end of the Jordan Compact.
Since it was first announced in early 2016, the compact provided Syrians with access to the formal labour market with heavily reduced fees for work permits (funded by international donors). It also led to a slew of programmes seeking to facilitate Syrian labour market access.
While it never encompassed all Syrian refugees – only around 18% of those working in late 2023 held a permit – the compact received widespread international praise for treating refugees as an economic opportunity rather than a burden.
But eight and a half years later, aid funding and attention are moving elsewhere, creating existential questions about the Jordan Compact’s future. It’s time to re-evaluate the entire system and push for legal changes to refugee employment that are based on rights, potential, and skills, rather than just what donors are prepared to fund given political and financial constraints.
Inclusion and debt
The latest changes to permit fees did not come out of the blue. Amendments to Jordan’s Social Security Law meant that, from October 2023, several categories of workers had to pay increased mandatory social security contributions of 56 dinars ($79) per month. This included Syrians holding flexible work permits, which essentially license self-employment and are the most popular permit among Syrians.
This change was backdated to January 2023, leaving a majority of Syrians who had formalised their work in the wake of the Jordan Compact with sudden, huge, and unaffordable debts from unpaid social security contributions – a system they are now automatically enrolled in when they receive their permits. These contributions continue to grow the longer they go unpaid.
Prior to this policy change, the provision of work permits to Syrian refugees, combined with their subscription to Jordan’s Social Security Corporation (SSC) for benefits for work-related injuries, unemployment, maternity, old age, and disability had been hailed as global best practice by the international community.
Including refugees in national social protection systems is currently high on the international policy agenda: The UN’s refugee agency, UNHCR, advocates for it with national governments, and donors are increasingly looking to fund this sort of inclusion.
But it is still rare, so Jordan’s moves have been celebrated as an innovative way to increase decent work opportunities and uphold international labour standards.
A system that doesn’t meet refugee needs
In response to the new fees, donors and international organisations are now discussing possible reforms to the system in Jordan. These talks are focused on maintaining the affordability of work permits and social security contributions, combined with a waiver for accumulated debts, better communication about the (ostensible) benefits of social security, and a plan for how to maintain consistency of regulations.
But the perspectives of Syrian refugees on these issues differ notably from those of international actors. During a series of 10 focus group discussions in March 2024 that we designed and conducted with Syrian refugee workers across Jordan, it became clear that they mostly view registering for social security as more of an added tax than a social protection. This is because the system falls short of meeting their actual needs.
Very few Syrians, who are already unable to make ends meet and are faced with assistance cuts, are able or willing to renew work permits and social security subscriptions under the new fee structure.
Access to benefits like pensions and payments in case of injury, disability, or death at work, is poor and can easily be denied. One participant from Sahab, a city southeast of Amman, reported sustaining a major foot injury during his factory work. His manager refused to accept that it was a workplace injury, so he was forced to pay for private medical treatment despite paying into the social security system.
Many people also expressed concerns about whether they would actually be able to withdraw their contributions, an option principally available to non-Jordanian citizens, including Syrians – based on the assumption that they will eventually leave the country – as well as women who stop working. That they primarily see social security contributions as – at best – a refundable deposit illustrates the level of Syrians’ disillusionment about the benefits the social security system can bring, and their deep scepticism about the sustainability of their inclusion in it.
Indeed, Syrian workers who do not pay all their contributions every month or pay them in full retroactively (an impossibility for many workers who do not have regular employment) are not allowed to withdraw them, and the rules around the process keep changing.
This “exhausting cycle”, as a Syrian man in Amman described it, is now compounded by the fact that social security subscription has become a significant source of debt, threats, and insecurity. As one Syrian woman in Amman put it: “We didn’t know [it] would become a burden, like taking a loan from a bank with accumulating interest.”
The combined effect of these factors is that very few Syrians, who are already unable to make ends meet and are faced with assistance cuts, are able or willing to renew work permits and social security subscriptions under the new fee structure. As a Syrian man in Irbid summarised: “I could not send my son to school because I do not have a job now, so how can we secure fees, whether for issuing permits or for subscribing to social security?”
Short-term thinking
Since millions of Syrians began fleeing the country in the wake of the uprising against the regime of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad in 2011, there has been no clear long-term vision for responding to the presence of Syrian refugees in the region, or in Jordan. While most Syrians in the focus group discussions said they feel socially comfortable in Jordan, administrative regulations are often short-term, restrictive, complex, and subject to change, hindering their quest for a stable and dignified life.
After more than a decade, there is a dire need for a comprehensive, holistic, and development-oriented response to the protracted displacement of so many Syrians. But the humanitarian response is still mainly operating on an emergency basis.
It’s time for a new reform that will allow refugees in Jordan to make informed decisions that they believe are right for them.
At the same time, politicians and others are increasingly speaking about returning refugees to Syria. This vision, first pushed strongly in other neighbouring host countries like Lebanon and Türkiye, is now gaining traction in Jordan. For example, Interior Minister Mazen al-Farrayeh stated in July that “the Jordanian government’s priority is its citizens, not refugees, and refugees’ original homeland is their homeland.”
All of this makes refugees feel a profound scepticism toward inclusion in government schemes purportedly designed to support their medium-term future in the country.
The best part of a decade after the launch of the Jordan Compact, it’s time for a new reform that will allow refugees in Jordan to make informed decisions that they believe are right for them.
One way forward is an “exit option” that would let refugees who hold work permits leave the government social security system by signing up for private insurance. This is the only way to stop people from avoiding signing up for work permits because they fear the system while ensuring that they also get the minimum amount of social protection.
More broadly, it’s time for a thorough re-evaluation of how donors, aid agencies and host countries think about refugees and work. The desire and pressure to make the Jordan Compact a success was so strong that aid agencies ended up relying on temporary, donor-funded measures like skills training, cash for work projects, or subsidies to keep work permit fees low.
Now that international attention and funding are turning elsewhere, the limited longevity of these measures is abundantly clear. Refugees want to work and they want protection, but they don’t want to be forced into a system that puts them in debt and doesn’t work for them. This is the moment to make real change that will outlast funding streams, put refugees’ rights and real needs first, and appreciate the actual contributions they could make to the country.
