The African Union (AU) is to play a key role in discussions between Northern and Southern Sudan following a referendum that is widely expected to initiate the secession of the latter.
The partners in Sudan’s Government of National Unity, the northern National Congress Party and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), which has been in power in Southern Sudan since a 2005 peace accord, agreed on 23 June that “negotiations on post-2011 referendum issues and arrangements shall be facilitated by AUHIP [the AU’s High-level Implementation Panel for Sudan] supported by IGAD [the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, a regional grouping], the IGAD partners’ forum and the UN”.
Formed in 2008 by the AU’s Peace and Security Council to investigate the Darfur crisis, AUHIP is led by former presidents Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Pierre Buyoya of Burundi and Abdulsalami Abubaker of Nigeria.
According to the same memorandum of understanding, signed after talks in Mekelle, Ethiopia, the negotiations will be divided into four themes, each with their own working group: citizenship; security; financial, economic and natural resources; and international treaties and legal issues.
The “principles, guidelines and negotiation framework” are due to be set out on 1 July, with the actual negotiations scheduled to start four days later.
Contradictory role
Thus the AU, whose Constitutive Act enshrines as a founding principle “respect of borders existing on achievement of independence” now finds itself in the somewhat contradictory position of overseeing arrangements that will probably culminate in the break-up of an African state.
As the International Crisis Group points out in Sudan: Regional Perspectives on the Prospect of Southern Independence, the AU is a signatory and guarantor of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
“Thus, while it has an obligation to do everything in its power to make unity attractive in Sudan, it is also bound to respect the right of self-determination. If it were to renege, the credibility of the institution would suffer in the region and beyond. It is in some degree torn, and divisions among its member states in response to the referendum result could be disastrous. The way the body responds will be important not just for Sudan, but for the AU itself.”
International response
Since the CPA was signed in 2005, several international fora have sought to coordinate international involvement in its implementation, with varying degrees of success. The Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC) was established in October 2005 in accordance with the CPA, while other ad-hoc bodies have emerged more recently.
The “E6” group, for example, is comprised of six special envoys representing China, the European Union, France, Russia, the UK and US. The E6 has begun meeting regularly - notably in Moscow last October and in Sudan in May - and issuing statements, which harness the collective political and diplomatic pressure of the nations and international bodies the six envoys represent.
On the fifth anniversary of the signing of the CPA in January this year, two men who had a critical hand in the peace process – Lt. Gen. Lazarus Sumbeiywo, the chief mediator, and former US Special Envoy John Danforth - argued that “unless international support is dramatically increased to help north and south agree on the foundations of their future, the elections and referendum may throw Sudan back into civil war”.
But as ICG analyst Zach Vertin pointed out, the onus for a smooth CPA endgame lies not only with the AU. “Coordinating international engagement is crucial, but it’s also important to remember that, first and foremost, it is Sudan’s two dominant parties that will be responsible for resolving the outstanding CPA agenda and preserving the peace,” he told IRIN. “International actors can play a pivotal supporting role, though the trust and confidence of the parties is essential for any third-party engagement to bear fruit.”
Clear mandate
Also key, according to Jon Temin of the United States Institute of Peace, is restricting the complexity of external involvement. “A single mediator with a clear and strong mandate should lead negotiations on post-referendum arrangements,” he wrote in a recent report.
This mediator should be “strong enough to prevent ‘forum shopping’ and contain or co-opt spoilers”, he added.
Another issue is whether, despite having signed the Mekelle memorandum, the SPLM has complete faith in the AU, given the body’s past pro-unity stance.
“There’s a historical legacy of mistrust,” noted one western diplomat in Juba, who asked not to be named.
“The SPLM has come round to a large but not complete degree. They will want to balance the AU’s involvement, make sure others, such as the UN and Norway, are involved,” he added.
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The partners in Sudan’s Government of National Unity, the northern National Congress Party and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), which has been in power in Southern Sudan since a 2005 peace accord, agreed on 23 June that “negotiations on post-2011 referendum issues and arrangements shall be facilitated by AUHIP [the AU’s High-level Implementation Panel for Sudan] supported by IGAD [the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, a regional grouping], the IGAD partners’ forum and the UN”.
Formed in 2008 by the AU’s Peace and Security Council to investigate the Darfur crisis, AUHIP is led by former presidents Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Pierre Buyoya of Burundi and Abdulsalami Abubaker of Nigeria.
According to the same memorandum of understanding, signed after talks in Mekelle, Ethiopia, the negotiations will be divided into four themes, each with their own working group: citizenship; security; financial, economic and natural resources; and international treaties and legal issues.
The “principles, guidelines and negotiation framework” are due to be set out on 1 July, with the actual negotiations scheduled to start four days later.
Contradictory role
Thus the AU, whose Constitutive Act enshrines as a founding principle “respect of borders existing on achievement of independence” now finds itself in the somewhat contradictory position of overseeing arrangements that will probably culminate in the break-up of an African state.
As the International Crisis Group points out in Sudan: Regional Perspectives on the Prospect of Southern Independence, the AU is a signatory and guarantor of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
 International actors can play a pivotal supporting role, though the trust and confidence of the parties is essential for any third-party engagement to bear fruit |
International response
Since the CPA was signed in 2005, several international fora have sought to coordinate international involvement in its implementation, with varying degrees of success. The Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC) was established in October 2005 in accordance with the CPA, while other ad-hoc bodies have emerged more recently.
The “E6” group, for example, is comprised of six special envoys representing China, the European Union, France, Russia, the UK and US. The E6 has begun meeting regularly - notably in Moscow last October and in Sudan in May - and issuing statements, which harness the collective political and diplomatic pressure of the nations and international bodies the six envoys represent.
On the fifth anniversary of the signing of the CPA in January this year, two men who had a critical hand in the peace process – Lt. Gen. Lazarus Sumbeiywo, the chief mediator, and former US Special Envoy John Danforth - argued that “unless international support is dramatically increased to help north and south agree on the foundations of their future, the elections and referendum may throw Sudan back into civil war”.
But as ICG analyst Zach Vertin pointed out, the onus for a smooth CPA endgame lies not only with the AU. “Coordinating international engagement is crucial, but it’s also important to remember that, first and foremost, it is Sudan’s two dominant parties that will be responsible for resolving the outstanding CPA agenda and preserving the peace,” he told IRIN. “International actors can play a pivotal supporting role, though the trust and confidence of the parties is essential for any third-party engagement to bear fruit.”
Clear mandate
Also key, according to Jon Temin of the United States Institute of Peace, is restricting the complexity of external involvement. “A single mediator with a clear and strong mandate should lead negotiations on post-referendum arrangements,” he wrote in a recent report.
| There’s a historical legacy of mistrust |
Another issue is whether, despite having signed the Mekelle memorandum, the SPLM has complete faith in the AU, given the body’s past pro-unity stance.
“There’s a historical legacy of mistrust,” noted one western diplomat in Juba, who asked not to be named.
“The SPLM has come round to a large but not complete degree. They will want to balance the AU’s involvement, make sure others, such as the UN and Norway, are involved,” he added.
mf/eo/am/mw
This article was produced by IRIN News while it was part of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Please send queries on copyright or liability to the UN. For more information: https://shop.un.org/rights-permissions
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