IRIN Interview with UN Humanitarian Coordinator

The following is an interview with Erick de Mul, UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Afghanistan. QUESTION: Afghanistan has been cited as the worst country of which to be a citizen in 2001. Predictions are that the situation can only worsen during year. Would you agree with this? ANSWER: I fully agree. I think we still underestimate the real drama that is unfolding in Afghanistan. There are a number of reasons as to why the situation is so bad. First, there is an accumulated deficit that has resulted partly from the lack of response to donor appeals. Every year we present donors with the needs of the population and repeatedly the response covers only about 30-50 percent of the total. Over a number of years this accumulates and one of the results is that the coping mechanisms of Afghans has been eroded away over the last five to seven years. They have nothing left. Second, we could have done more in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the productive sectors, notably the agricultural sector. These areas were neglected while donors continued to focus on emergency aid. As a result, there has been a significant decline in the agricultural sector, which has had serious consequences in the context of the two-year drought. If we could have done more in rehabilitation, the negative impact of the drought would have been less. Q: So although there was an acute emergency situation in parts of Afghanistan, you believe that the international community should have been more focused towards Afghan self-sufficiency? A: I think there was too much of a focus on survival and much less on building or enhancing self-sufficiency. There has been a compounding of events: first, an accumulated deficit of support and a consequent lack of investment in the productive sectors. Then there has been a drought that wiped out crops and herds and resulted in a large percentage of the population losing their livelihoods. In terms of recovery, crop production could recover within a short period of time, maybe one or two years. But to replenish livestock, we're looking at four to five years. Land can be replanted and ploughed, but restocking a herd that has been decimated to 20 percent of its original size takes years. In addition, it had been hoped that the Taliban movement would have by now changed its focus from security and war to create the semblance of a [civil] administration. This has not happened. The Taliban focus remains squarely on the same agenda with which it came into Afghanistan and with which it has been operating ever since. The ban on poppy cultivation has also had its consequences. Although it was good that the ban was enforced and rather well implemented, it has also led to a loss in income and jobs. Farmers have to reorganise their land and have not been compensated for the change. There is a need for support there. Q: But has enforcement of the ban [on opium poppy cultivation] not been somewhat half-hearted? A: The impression is that it is effectively enforced in the south, in Helmand province. Many people have lost their jobs and the daily wage has dropped in the Kandahar region. This is not only because of joblessness [from poppy cultivation] but also due to the influx of internally displaced people into the area. The supply of labour has increased rather dramatically. When I was there, people were quoting 5,000 Afghanis as a daily wage, which is about seven cents [US]. In order to buy one meal for a family, one person would have to work for a whole week. Q: Have donors not indicated that they may increase support in the light of the scale of the crisis? A: Some are but others are also tearing their hair out and wondering what can be done? Most donors have taken the decision to maintain funding at the same levels of the past years. But there also needs to be a realisation that the situation is much worse than in previous years. Even if this happens [the donors maintain funding], is it really possible for a number of donors to steeply increase their contribution? This is not a question of increasing [aid] by 10 percent; we're looking at a situation that requires donors to double their efforts, and that is not a realistic expectation at present. Q: Do you think part of the donor fatigue results from a reluctance to provide funds for assistance while the warring factions continue to divert their funds to continue the war? A: Of course there is a frustration in the donor community. Often they are trying their level best to get things going and reach out to the Afghan population. At the same time, they see that those who could do something about it [the factions] focus solely on one issue - and that is to keep the war going. So you see quite a lot of money being spent on destructive activities, and little to help the civilian population. Local investment in roads and communications is for the benefit of a small elite and for the war effort. Investments in roads are useful for troops, trade and smuggling. If you travel into Afghanistan, the first impression is that it looks fine because there are shops and trucks on the road. But that's a façade and it only benefits a small percentage of the population - the traders basically. You don't see investment in anything else. But behind that façade you see an enormous amount of people living in total destitution and severe misery. Q: In continuing the fighting while the Afghan population is starving, do you think that these warring factions are complicit in human rights violations? A: Absolutely. I think that's another issue that is disturbing. There are two different worlds there - one is the world of the fighters, who have a clear target of winning the war, and the other is the Afghan population, which remains neglected and victimised. Q: The long term solution must be an end to the conflict itself. With your experience of dealing with Afghans and the Taliban movement, do you have any thoughts as to how the international community could approach this? A: In order to bring people to the table and convince them it would be better to have peace than war, I think you need to clearly demonstrate that it would be beneficial to both sides. In other words, you shouldn't come empty-handed. First and foremost, the Afghan war is a proxy war with a lot of involvement from neighbouring states. A more concerted effort should be undertaken to stop that. Q: But surely the imposition of sanctions is an example of the UN Security Council trying to stop weapons from going into the region? A: There are other instruments apart from sanctions. As long as there is inadequate pressure on neighbouring states to stop them interfering with the warring factions, then the conflict will continue. The sanctions this time around may help but it is difficult to see how the arms embargo can be monitored. You would need to make it attractive for the warring factions to stop fighting. One way of doing this would be to indicate that reconstruction, rehabilitation and, eventually, investment would be a high priority for Afghanistan if the war stops. But that has to be a fairly concrete proposal and not just a promise. Q: So you think a reconstruction fund for Afghanistan could help encourage an end to the fighting? A: It's a good idea but it's not enough. It has to be combined with the possibility of serious investment, which is what the country needs. A country can survive on donor money but it can't get on its feet. Simultaneously, help is needed to create conditions that would entice international capital to start investing in the country. That's a tough act to perform but a start would be to make an agenda and try and go through a number of steps: first, extract the neighbouring countries out of the theatre; second, offer a reasonable reconstruction and rehabilitation package to both sides; and third, help to create a situation where foreign investment can come in. There still seems to be [international] resistance and reluctance to try this. Q: We have seen over 150,000 people crossing into Pakistan since September according to UNHCR. Is this the beginning of a much larger movement of people? A: We have a different scenario this year. Massive displacement within Afghanistan has already started. There could also soon be massive starvation. People will still move to borders even if they know they're officially closed. If they had means to survive inside the country they wouldn't leave, of course. They only do it because they have nothing left, out of pure desperation. I think this is really the tip of the iceberg. Apart from the immediate consequences of the drought - the low yields and the loss of livestock - we are seeing a new structural change that we did not notice before. In areas of fruit and nut production, such as Kandahar, it will take three to four years to revive orchards and vineyards that have been wiped out. But people who have lost everything cannot wait that long, so they are levelling their vineyards and planting wheat. These structural changes in agriculture - the ban on poppy cultivation and the shift away from fruits and nuts to grow wheat for survival - will have repercussions. As we are talking, temperatures over the whole belt: Herat to Faizabad Mazar and Kabul, have dropped and there is a lot of snowfall. It is extremely difficult for the displaced populations, and we will have some sad stories coming out. [Over 150 deaths from cold and exposure have already been recorded in camps in Herat.] On the other hand, snowfall could bring a better spring season than last year. Q: How do you see the refugee situation on the border with Pakistan being resolved? As you know, the Pakistan authorities are sending Afghans back and refusing to allow any new camps to be set up in the border areas. A: One can understand the position of Pakistan because, after so many years of having to deal with Afghan refugees on their territory, they find more coming over now. We would like to see more leniency from the Pakistani authorities. This perhaps would be the case if the international community were in a position to help Afghan refugees in Pakistan but UNHCR is severely under-funded. Increased assistance by the international community may help to convince the Pakistan authorities to change their position. Otherwise, I think that Pakistan will probably maintain its position. This will result in a lot of Afghans caught between a rock and a hard place: on the one hand, wanting to leave Afghanistan because they have lost their livelihoods, and then not being able to come to Pakistan to receive assistance. We could try and do more inside Afghanistan but, given the enormity of the problem and the limited possibilities of UN and NGOs, it's just too much. Given the level of funding available for inside Afghanistan, our ability to support these people is very limited.