IRIN Briefing on the Lusaka peace process

The DRC government and rebels have lately been stepping up the propaganda war, and there are mounting allegations of ceasefire violations. Is the Lusaka peace accord, set up to prevent a return to war, collapsing? IRIN examines the issue through a series of questions and answers. Who signed the Lusaka Agreement? The Agreement on a Ceasefire in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was signed by six countries - DRC, Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda and Uganda - on 10 July 1999 in an effort to end what is a regional war being played out in the DRC. It broke out in August 1998 and saw the DRC government of President Laurent-Desire Kabila, backed by Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, pitched against a Congolese rebellion backed by Rwanda and Uganda. The rebel Mouvement de liberation congolais (MLC), led by Jean-Pierre Bemba and supported by Uganda, signed the accord on 1 August 1999. After a protracted internal disagreement in the other main rebel movement, the Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie (RCD), including dissension between two factions - the ‘Goma’ faction, led by Emile Ilunga and backed by Rwanda, and the Ugandan-backed ‘Kisangani’ faction (now renamed RCD-Mouvement de liberation, or RCD-ML) led by Ernest Wamba dia Wamba - over who should sign the agreement on the movement’s behalf, the RCD also signed up to the Lusaka agreement on 31 August 1999. Burundi attended successive rounds of the Lusaka talks as an observer but did not sign the agreement because the signatories acknowledged themselves as “belligerents” in the DRC conflict, while Burundi has consistently denied being so. Regional analysts told IRIN that Burundi officials admit the country has troops in the DRC but insist they are there to defend Burundi and not as a belligerent force. Burundi has also requested membership of the Political Committee and the Joint Military Commission (JMC) established to implement the Lusaka agreement, but this has so far been denied, diplomatic sources told IRIN. What was agreed at Lusaka? The main provisions of the agreement included: - the immediate cessation of hostilities - the establishment of the JMC, comprising the belligerent parties under a neutral chairman appointed by the OAU, to investigate ceasefire violations, work out mechanisms to disarm identified militias and monitor the withdrawal of foreign troops according to an agreed schedule - the deployment of an “appropriate” (peacekeeping and peace-enforcement) UN mission tasked with disarming the armed groups, collecting weapons from civilians and providing humanitarian assistance and protection to vulnerable populations; and - initiating an “inter-Congolese dialogue” intended to lead to “a new political dispensation in the DRC”. (The “armed groups” identified included Rwandan Interahamwe and ex-FAR, Congolese Mayi-Mayi militias, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in Uganda, Angolan UNITA rebels and the Burundian Forces pour la defense de la democratie (FDD).) What has happened since? The ceasefire was due to come into place within 24 hours of the signing of the agreement - which diplomatic sources interpret as 31 August, when the RCD signed. However there have been continuous claims and counter-claims of ceasefire violations by both sides, including military attacks, territorial advances, troop deployments, and reinforcements within and across borders. Troop movements are said to be continuing. Analysts say that in order to be seen to be abiding by the agreement, the Lusaka signatories have reportedly been pursuing their military aims through “proxies”, not bound by the accord, such as the Interahamwe and ex-FAR, Mayi-Mayi, FDD and other irregular forces. Neither has there been much let-up in the propaganda war, which has become particularly vitriolic in the past week with both sides making increasingly warlike pronouncements and the MLC reportedly declaring the ceasefire “null and void” after an alleged attack at the weekend by DRC forces on their positions at Dongo, on the border with the Republic of Congo. The establishment of the JMC was long delayed by negotiations over the appointment of a chairman, wrangles about RCD representation and procedural issues, as well financing and logistical problems. Algerian General Rachid Lallali was subsequently appointed to chair the JMC. Its first working meeting on 11 and 12 October was dominated by procedural issues, and it really got down to the business of implementing the agreement at its second plenary session from 31 Otcober to 5 November. Working groups have recently been established under the JMC to come up with mechanisms to disarm identified militias and schedule the orderly withdrawal of foreign troops. The deployment of any UN peacekeeping mission is many months away, at best, and highly dependent on continued progress on other aspects of the peace deal. There is still no sign of progress on the inter-Congolese dialogue on the political future of the DRC, with the protagonists so far unable to agree even on a facilitator for the process. Has the peace deal broken down? JMC chairman General Rachid Lallali told IRIN the allegations of ceasefire violations and the MLC’s reported declaration of the accord as “null and void” - of which he had not been officially informed - did not mean the ceasefire was over because the JMC had been established in anticipation of such difficulties, “to investigate, check and evaluate these allegations”. A political committee meeting of the belligerents’ defence and foreign affairs representatives in Lusaka on 15 October noted that “the parties to the Agreement had generally continued to respect the ceasefire,” according to a report from UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the Security Council last week. Regional analyst Filip Reyntjens also told IRIN that the frontlines identified in Lusaka had held fairly well, apart from inevitable skirmishes and “minor incidents,” except in the north where the ceasefire had been “considerably violated”. Who is investigating these alleged violations? The JMC, representing all the signatories, was established under the ceasefire agreement to regulate and monitor the cessation of hostilities until the deployment of UN and OAU military observers. It was also to be responsible, together with the military observers, for peacekeeping functions until the deployment of a UN force. Currently based in Lusaka, the JMC comprises two members each from the belligerent parties, including the MLC and both of the RCD factions, as well as observers from Zambia and fully participating representatives of the UN and OAU. At its first functional meeting in Kampala on 11 and 12 October, the JMC decided to deploy observers at four ‘regional JMCs’ in DRC - at Lisala and Boende (Equateur Province), Kabinda (Kasai Orientale) and Kabalo (Katanga) ·to verify the parties’ positions and investigate ceasefire violations. The JMC had also received intelligence on the positions of the various forces on the ground and agreed in Kampala on a map of frontline positions from which it would now work, diplomatic sources told IRIN. The second full session of the JMC, held in Lusaka from 31 October to 5 November, considered the logistics of establishing the four operational JMCs and deploying OAU military observers. It also established working groups to consider: the determination of humanitarian corridors and the exchange of POWs; mechanisms for the disarmament of armed groups and civilian Congolese in illegal possession of arms; mechanisms for the disengagement of rival forces, and for the orderly withdrawal of foreign forces. Those groups are scheduled to meet again in Harare from 25 November to prepare to present their findings to the third full session of the JMC from 30 November, also in Harare. What is the current state of play? Some reports have said the JMC, for which a US $5 million budget was envisaged, had been crippled by a lack of finance. It was envisaged at the start that the JMC would work full-time but, so far, neither the “money in the bank” nor the pledges made have been sufficient to make it fully operational yet. Lallali played down the budgetary restraints. “We are not a private company to be bankrupt ... we will work with what we have,” he told IRIN. In his recent report to the UN Security Council, Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed that the UN “provide the JMC with the necessary logistical and other operational support”. Such logistical support, including air capability, has now been made available to the JMC for ceasefire verification, UN sources told IRIN. General Rachid Lallali added that the OAU would deploy 30 or more military observers to the DRC this weekend. What does all this mean for the peace process? Great Lakes analyst Filip Reytjens told IRIN that while the JMC and its budget were inadequate for the peacekeeping functions which fall within its mandate (until the UN deploys a peacekeeping force), it could still achieve quite a lot operating “basically as a contact group” as it is doing now, “essentially serving to liaise between the observers to be deployed and the responsible parties”. In this way, he said, the JMC could “help avoid misunderstandings, incidents and so on” that might otherwise undermine the ceasefire. Richard Cornwell of the Institute of Security Studies in South Africa said that, in addition to the JMC’s mandate being far too big, it was set up for a task to be taken over by the UN. Analysts agree there is little possibility of the UN Security Council approving a “Chapter 7” UN mission with a peace-enforcing mandate, despite this being contained in the Lusaka agreement. The analysts believe that with the peace accord being so “vague” about issues such as the disarmament of “negative forces”, the size and cost of the force needed and the potential for massive casualties in a theatre as vast as the DRC, the UN would be very wary of a large and “premature” commitment. What is MONUC’s role? The UN’s first phase involvement under the peace deal was to establish an Observer Mission to the DRC (MONUC). This has set up its advance headquarters in Kinshasa and deployed military liaison officers (MLOs) in Kinshasa, Kigali, Kampala, Harare and Windhoek as the capitals of the state signatories. Liaison officers have also been sent to Bujumbura, to Lusaka as the provisional seat of the JMC, to OAU headquarters, and a liaison officer is expected to go to Luanda when conditions allow. MONUC has been establishing contact with the relevant players at their headquarters and gathering intelligence. It also participated actively in the JMC meetings, though work remains to be done on the relationship, division of responsibilities and the nature of the “interface” with the JMC, diplomatic sources said. MONUC’s capacity to observe the ceasefire, help the JMC investigate ceasefire violations, make a security assessment of the country and determine the present and future locations of combatants’ positions would require it to deploy through the country and at the fronts. Until now it has been unable to deploy as it wishes and is effectively “grounded” in Kinshasa, as a result of inadequate security guarantees from the DRC government and differences with Kinshasa on the need for it to deploy in government-held areas. MONUC also has a humanitarian mandate and humanitarian officials have expressed frustration that military activities appear to be the only focus of MONUC’s efforts - despite the seriousness of a situation in which the UN recently reported more than 800,000 Congolese are internally displaced and 10 million people are suffering from food insecurity. Meanwhile, a UN technical survey team intended to assess security conditions and infrastructure in some 13 proposed locations throughout the country as an essential part of preparing the ground for planned second and third phases of UN intervention has also been frustrated by repeated denials of flight clearance and inadequate security guarantees by the Kinshasa authorities. A section of the survey team received clearance and left for Goma on Monday, according to sources in Kinshasa. Is anything happening to speed up the peace process? The Political Committee, comprising the DRC combatants, has expressed concern over “the slow pace at which the UN was handling the request for the deployment of peacekeepers in the DRC”. Kofi Annan has recommended to the UN Security Council that 500 military observers - as well as humanitarian, child protection, civilian police, human rights and administrative personnel - should be deployed to DRC. However, in extending MONUC’s mandate last week to 15 January 2000, the Security Council made no move on approving the military observers or humanitarian support personnel. Is there any political advance? The Political Committee has also urged the Congolese parties, with the assistance of the OAU, to “expedite consultations on the appointment of a neutral facilitator for the inter-Congolese negotiations”, which are supposed to lead to the “new political dispensation for the DRC”. The government has convened its own “national debate”, without participation from rebel-held areas of the country, but which diplomatic sources said may be useful in establishing consensus on the government side if run properly. Nevertheless, they stressed this was not a replacement for the inter-Congolese dialogue provided for in the Lusaka accord. While Kabila’s government has accepted the facilitators proposed by the OAU - the International Organisation of La Francophonie and the Italian Catholic Communita Sant’ Egidio - for the inter-Congolese dialogue, the rebel RCD-ML has stated its preference for Sant’ Egidio as “the sole neutral facilitator”. RCD-Goma meanwhile, has rejected both La Francophonie and Sant’ Egidio, saying it wanted “a college of facilitators composed of African personalities whose moral integrity and independence are not questionable”. The OAU is understood to be currently searching for a facilitator acceptable to all sides - though analysts told IRIN the organisation has been very slow to “put its foot in the door and take centre stage in the Lusaka process” - but, meanwhile, the national dialogue is stalled. Conclusion On the military side, much depends on how quickly the JMC, OAU and UN can get military observers in the field to monitor the ceasefire, investigate violations and address these through the JMC. Only then, analysts say, will it have the breathing space to work out mechanisms for the core issues - disarming the militia forces and the orderly withdrawal of foreign troops. At the same time, none of this will be sustainable without progress on the political dialogue within DRC. Numerous parties have highlighted the slow pace of progress and lamented the apparent absence of real commitment by the international community to ensure the momentum for peace is not lost. “The fewer deadlines are achieved, the more that are lost or delayed, the less confidence there will be in the process and the more likely the belief will set in that the Lusaka document really is a work of fiction,” said Richard Cornwell of the Institute of Security Studies, which has been following the process closely. However, many analysts and diplomats agree that the Lusaka Agreement is currently “the best option on the table” for peace in the DRC and deserves the active support of the international community until such time as it can be “haltingly implemented” or “breaks down irredeemably”.