IRIN Interview with the Special Representative of the UN

The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Sierra Leone, Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji, spoke to IRIN on the tasks confronting the UN mission (UNAMSIL) in helping to secure a renewed peace agreement, after fighting broke out last month between government forces and the rebels of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). QUESTION: How would you define the situation we now face in relation to the peace process? ANSWER: In an emergency period, of course, caused by the provocation (and) fighting by the RUF which started by detaining over 500 peacekeepers and launching attacks on various locations occupied by peacekeepers. And this has since provoked generalised fighting by the RUF and forces loyal to the government. Once that period is over - I suppose one can only say that it's over when a ceasefire is declared so obviously, following the visit of the (Economic Community of West African States) ECOWAS Committee of Six (a technical committee comprising Guinea, Liberia, Ghana, Nigeria, Togo and Mali to assess the modalities of a ceasefire) once the ceasefire is declared and fighting ceases, we can pick up the peace process once again on the basis of a general agreement, on the basis of the Lome Agreement (the July 1999 peace accord violated by the RUF). Q: What’s the role of the UN in this interim period of renewed fighting? A: Our role is still what it was. We came here to assist in the implementation of the Lome Agreement, every facet of it, ranging from the disarmament and demobilisation programme, in which we had a major role, to the installation of civil authority over the country in which we also had a major role. And those roles are still valid, because in spite of the fighting there are still occasionally, particularly RUF elements, who come to disarm. And the only group you can disarm to is, of course, UNAMSIL. We are still also trying to re-deploy to areas where we were when the fighting broke out. And we want to reassure people not only of UNAMSIL's continued presence, but to reassure them that the peace process, even if it is now suspended, will be immediately recommenced as soon as the situation warrants. In other words, to reassure them we have not dismantled the necessary logistics and conditions for the immediate resumption of the peace process once the situation warrants it. Q: What was the significance of the ECOWAS (Abuja) summit in relation to the peace process; and the issue of a peace enforcement mandate, and a West African Force Commander to head UNAMSIL? A: The importance of the ECOWAS summit in Abuja was inestimable. Because, as you know, it's always seen by the United Nations and certainly by ECOWAS itself that ECOWAS will continue to have a major role to play in the Sierra Leone peace process, even if the ECOWAS military presence (ECOMOG) is no longer on the ground. So, in that context, when the violations of the Lome Agreement occurred, when the RUF started this process, it was clear that ECOWAS has to immediately put into play its political clout and that was what ECOWAS did, at various levels. The ECOWAS Committee on Sierra Leone started meeting in Abuja (on 9 May) and then the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Resolution and Security met in Liberia, and this was followed by the ECOWAS summit. So it emphasises the importance ECOWAS attaches to the Sierra Leone peace process, and the unfortunate violation of the Lome Agreement, which resulted in the crisis that we now face. Peacekeeping or peace enforcement? Now, as far as the decisions by ECOWAS are concerned, these are decisions that would need of course follow-up. First of all the ceasefire: They decided that before they could recommend a ceasefire date to all the parties concerned, they needed to be present on the ground. The issue ofpeace enforcement was discussed, and came in the context of ECOMOG operations in Sierra Leone, but by the time the summit came together, they then decided that the best bet was to have additional troops from the subregion to operate under the umbrella of UNAMSIL. There was still the talk of whether the mandate should be changed to that of further peace enforcement or not, and quite frankly, contrary to the (ECOWAS) communiqué, the situation was not as clear-cut. What was reflected in the communiqué was the original demand for a peace enforcement mandate. But after calling their attention to the latest report by the (UN) Secretary-General (in mid-May) which pointed out that already UNAMSIL has a number of windows for enforcement action under Chapter 7 - they have a Chapter 7 mandate to protect themselves and also to protect their freedom of movement for the performance of their duties; they also have a window for protecting civilians who are in imminent danger - and so when you look at all this globally, and what they were expected to do here, they believed that really the mandate was sufficient. It was flexible enough and that seemed to persuade a number of heads of state who began to really question whether, in the circumstances, the Security Council would be willing to change the mandate to peace enforcement. And if the Security Council is not willing, whether their participation without UNAMSIL would still be valid or not. And they came to the conclusion that troops from the sub-region would at least be more willing to use the windows in Chapter 7, and if they are willing to use them, that should enable them to carry out their responsibilities, carry out the job they are supposed to do in Sierra Leone. The force commander issue Now, as far as the issue of the Force Commander is concerned, again that has featured all along. The argument being that because ECOMOG would have the majority troops in UNAMSIL, the Force Commander should come from an ECOWAS country. And also the argument that a subregional Force Commander would be more used to conditions in Sierra Leone. But to balance that, the point was made that it was absolutely essential that the global character of this force (UNAMSIL) should be preserved. It was pointed out that on the one hand ECOWAS, as well as Africa, cannot complain about marginalisation by the United Nations (in terms of conflict resolution in Africa) at the time when the United Nations (now) shows interest and puts in a lot of resources, we suddenly say 'No, now we want to be insular'. Again, it's an issue that has to be negotiated with the United Nations. Bearing in mind that the United Nations in designating a Force Commander has to consider all these issues, including the global character of the organisation itself and therefore its operations. So it's an issue on which ECOWAS gave me the impression they are open for negotiations and dialogue with the United Nations. Q: Going back to the summit's conclusions, it also called for the warring parties to return to their pre-Lome positions. Won't that be a bit complicated given that the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) fought alongside the RUF, but is now on the government's side? How will you draw the lines? A: It will be easy to draw in my view. That is why among those coming (in the Committee of Six) you'll find that three - Nigeria, Ghana and Guinea - form part of the last of the ECOMOG contingents in the country. So they were here up until around March/April - the last of the Nigerians left at the end of April. So they were all familiar with who was where at the signing of the Lome Agreement. I think what will be relevant would be where the RUF - which is isolated now and is the only opponent of this grand coalition - where it was at Lome, and where it is now, and this committee saying to the RUF: 'No, you have to go back to where you were'. Q: (Detained RUF leader Foday) Sankoh is definitely out, or is he being kept in the back pocket just in case you don't find anybody credible in the RUF to negotiate with? A: I do not believe that in any organisation as large as the RUF, you will not be able to find anybody to take over from somebody. Suppose the chap had dropped dead, what would have happened? Q: I think he made sure he had no rivals, he was a very ruthless man by all accounts .. A: The occasion makes the man very often, and so a situation can throw up someone that nobody had ever heard of. Here was Foday Sankoh who before the end, before he disappeared, even had the temerity as I would put it now (and I told him to his face at that time, I said: "'Look, you had the nerve to turn round and say to me, 'Oh, my boys are not keeping your missing UNAMSIL people, they are probably missing in the bush, but we are willing to help you search for them, but we don't have them'."). That's the guy who was supposed to be the leader of the RUF, a day before he disappeared. He's still incommunicado, and all these boys (peacekeepers) have been released. There was never an argument from any RUF interlocutor or the president of Liberia that no, we don't have them. Q: Is there going to be a special role for President Taylor (of Liberia) in a renewed Lome? A: Well, as much a role for him as for any ECOWAS head-of-state. Q: Nothing special? A: I don't think so. I don't think he himself would seek that. He does have a special relationship with the RUF which has enabled him to be helpful in a particular situation, but once the situation is resolved, I think he will want to play the same role that others are playing in the context of ECOWAS. Q: The international community's strategy seems to be a two-track approach of military pressure leading to negotiations. Isn't UNAMSIL a bit tempted to speed up the process and give a greater military hand to the government? A: Well, I don't know what you mean by giving a helping hand. The preference of the United Nations would be of course the cessation of all hostilities and resumption of the peace process, which is what brought the United Nations here in the first place. The United Nations was not invited here and was not deployed with a view to pursuing a military campaign. So the earlier things can go back, the better. And if through diplomatic action we can limit the damage - because each time in fighting just think in terms of the refugees alone - it provokes, it's not something that should be encouraged. That is why ECOWAS decided to send here quickly this Committee of Six, because the visit of the committee would make it possible to get everybody to accept a ceasefire on the basis of identifiable criteria which would then reassure everyone that nobody has profited from this (renewed conflict). Q: The Secretary-General seemed to set out quite a bold vision for UNAMSIL, involving possibly the clamping down on the diamond trade and deployment in Kono (the diamond-producing eastern region). When could this happen? A: Well, as soon as the troop level the Secretary-General requested from the Security Council is approved I think you'll see signs of that; that's the 16,500 troops. And ECOMOG's three battalions would make up the bulk of the additional 3,500 troops we are expecting (to take UNAMSIL's troop presence to 16,500). Q: With government forces advancing and UNAMSIL following, with the 16,500 troops, do you see a wider role for UNAMSIL? A: By the time the additional troops come in, hopefully the fighting would have stopped. And with the cessation of fighting would also be the additional step of assuring that all groups now comply with the Lome Agreement, which says the government of Sierra Leone would have control of all the territory of Sierra Leone. So, unless any one group wants to put itself in a position that it will go against the entire international community which is now poised to ensure that the Lome agreement is complied with, then I would envision that the honourable thing for all groups to do is ensure that each one commits itself to the peace process as was envisaged in Lome, and commits itself to disarmament and demobilisation that would not necessitate the need to hold on to positions from which either they can launch attacks, or they are able to maintain their war machine as in the case of the RUF now. Q: But there are a number of scenarios we can imagine: The RUF doesn't come to the negotiating table in good faith; some do but others continue a bandit war; or government forces themselves degenerate into some kind of banditry? A: Well, you cannot rule out such scenarios. The impact on the international community would be to reassess the situation and the Secretary-General in his report has left that opening that he may come back to the Security Council for additional troops if that kind of scenario were to arise. Q: What do you think has been learnt from Lome and what would you like to see included in a new, revised Lome? A: Well, I think the big lesson really is not what is included or excluded in Lome. The big lesson would be an insistence from the international community from the beginning that any semblance of violations of Lome will not be tolerated and therefore for that message to be sent loud and clear. Because with the best agreement in the world, if the parties are not committed, there is always the possibility it will go off track. And so in a situation where parties have been left alone to exercise their good faith and implement the agreement - and they have now shown that is not an assumption that is necessarily correct - it will now be left for the party that has been perceived and proved to be the violator, to show its good faith henceforth, or the international community will draw its own conclusions.