Insurgency little understood by coalition forces, says think-tank

The Iraqi insurgency, which is increasingly organised and coordinated, is little understood by those trying to fight it, according to the Brussels-based think-tank, International Crisis Group (ICG). “In Iraq, the US fights an enemy it hardly knows,” reads an ICG report released on 15 February. “Its descriptions have relied on gross approximations and crude categories…that bear only passing resemblance to reality.” Iraq Body Count, an international NGO, estimates that between 28,400 and 32,000 Iraqi civilians have been killed by coalition military action and military or paramilitary responses to the coalition presence since the US-led occupation of Iraq began in March 2003. Senior ICG analyst Peter Harling said that while the US military was monitoring insurgent activity on an operational level, key lessons were not being learned. “They’re monitoring [insurgent material], especially through consulting outfits, but I don’t think they are taking any of it into account, at least at the level of official discourse,” he said. “Failure to sufficiently take into account what the insurgents are saying is puzzling and, from Washington’s perspective, counter-productive,” the report notes. The study, based on an analysis of material from websites, videotapes, leaflets and chat-room discourse says that the insurgency is “acutely aware of public opinion” and mindful of its image. A key finding in the report is that the current military approach to stamping out the insurgency is failing. “An anti-insurgency approach primarily focused on reducing the insurgents’ perceived legitimacy…is far more likely to succeed,” the ICG notes. To achieve this, the think-tank says, the US and its allies must change tactics. “Excessive use of force by coalition troops, torture, resort to tactics that inflict widespread harm on civilians and reliance on sectarian militias simultaneously undermine US legitimacy and boost the insurgents’ own,” the report states. US Lt Barry Johnson, public affairs director of the multi-national forces in Iraq, denied that allegations of mistreatment by US forces had bolstered popular support for militant anti-occupation groups: “I don’t think anyone senses that there’s an increase in support for the insurgency,” he said. “Iraqis are becoming more and more disgusted by it, particularly by attacks against civilians,” Johnson added. Asked whether the US emphasis on a military approach was effective, he said: “I’m confident that the democratic process is working, and the military is only supporting that process.” Significantly, according to the ICG, the ongoing failure to effectively combat the insurgency may have serious implications for Iraq’s future. Harling noted that a withdrawal of foreign troops may not have the desired effect of bringing peace to the war-torn country. “An American withdrawal won’t necessarily have a decisive impact on the insurgency,” Harling said. “The enemy within has taken greater priority,” he added, explaining that the insurgency no longer focused exclusively on foreign troops. The ICG report notes that hunting down Iraqi “collaborators” had become a primary objective of insurgent groups. By October 2005, groups such as Tandhim al-Qaida and Jaysh Ansar al-Sunna “clearly began to designate the internal enemy as their top priority target”, it notes. According to the ICG, the four main insurgent groups operating in Iraq are: Tandhim al-Qaida fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (the al-Qaida organisation in Mesopotamia); Jaysh Ansar al-Sunna (Partisans of the Sunna Army); Al-Jaysh al-Islami fil-‘Iraq (the Islamic Army in Iraq); and Al-Jabha al-Islamiya lil-Muqawama al-‘Iraqiya (the Islamic Front for Iraqi Resistance). The think-tank makes a number of recommendations to the US and its allies, including: halting practices such as torture; making the new Iraqi government accountable for reigning in militias and respecting human rights; and expressing a willingness to negotiate the terms of its presence and rules of engagement.