Interview with UN Humanitarian Coordinator, Ramiro Lopes da Silva

Ramiro Lopes da Silva, the UN's Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq, spoke to IRIN about the UN's humanitarian response to the ongoing crisis and UNOCHI's relationship with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the new governing council. He spoke about the pressing need to improve security to facilitate aid and about the need to more successfully promote the work of the United Nations in Iraq. Below are extracts from the interview. QUESTION: We have recently seen the appointment of the Iraqi Governing Council which will choose the interim ministers. Presumably it has been difficult to work without having these Iraqi counterparts. How much is this going to make your work easier? ANSWER: On day to day activities - if you wish to use the term tactical activities - we have been working with our Iraqi counterparts, the technocrats in the ministries. So it is not a question of staying idle or not engaging Iraqis until the formation of the Governing Council. We engaged on day to day tasks. The importance for us - from a humanitarian viewpoint, from a reconstruction viewpoint - is that through the Council, and I hope soon through the cabinet of interim ministers selected by the Council, we will have a counterpart with whom we can discuss strategy and discuss policy - that is the difference. Q: And how easy has it been for you working with the Coalition on humanitarian issues - do you find you are getting decisions quickly and avoiding duplication of tasks? A: I think at the tactical, operational level our relations with the Coalition in delivering humanitarian and emergency rehabilitation assistance have been, since day one, much easier than they and we thought. I am not saying we don’t have problems or disagreements, but the relationship has been much easier. And I think, overall, one can have a positive view of these relations both prior to and after the passage of Resolution 1483, which brought a qualitative change in relations with the appointment of the Special Representative and the broadening of scope of these relations. Q: When you talk about filling the gaps, do you feel the CPA is responsible for managing the overall picture - are you working together, or what is the relationship? A: We all work together. You have assessments of needs being done by military civil affairs officers, by private contractors engaged by the Coalition, by USAID DART (Disaster Assistance Response Team) teams, by NGOs, by UN agencies, and we all contribute the knowledge we gain with each assessment - mainly by posting the results with the UN Humanitarian Information Centre (HIC), on the website. But both in terms of the Fourth Geneva Convention and Security Council Resolution 1483, the responsibility for the welfare of the Iraqi people rests with the Coalition and this is why we need to know what they are doing in order to meet the responsibility, so we can then see what the gaps are in their action plan for one reason or another, and determine our actions to fill the gaps - what we can do and cannot do. Q: There are still major problems here in Iraq, particularly with power cuts, sanitation, unclean water, increasing unemployment and displacement. Is this a crisis situation or how would you characterise it? A: There is a crisis, although not in traditional humanitarian terms. We have a crisis in the sense that you have a highly urbanised society and any urbanised society relies on a set of public services, so if those public services collapse, the overall working of society is negatively affected. Secondly, you have a highly urbanised population that has become, over the years, particularly over the 12 years of sanctions, highly dependent on services provided by the state. So if you have a collapse or disruption of public services and you have a civil administration that is still in turmoil, in a process of transition, the overall wellbeing of society is affected. In the particular case of Iraq today, it is further aggravated by the fragile law, order and general security situation. Q: And in terms of the law and order situation - how difficult is that making the humanitarian work of the UN? A: In simple terms it is making it difficult in two ways. First, because it imposes a lot of restrictions on freedom of movement, the ability for us to be with the population we serve, and to cover parts of the country. You know there are parts of the country that for us are still out of bounds. And even in the areas where we operate under phase four security, because of the volatility of the situation, we are operating with very harsh restrictive measures, particularly in terms of vehicles, communication systems, security apparatus and so on, and obviously that brings extra costs to the operation for the agencies and in the end for the donor community that supports our work. So those are the two main negative aspects. Q: Is the security situation preventing aid from getting to people? A: Yes. If I don’t have access, or as much access as I need, to determine the needs, and discuss with those in need how we should deliver the assistance required, to look for durable solutions for their concerns, we are not providing as much assistance as is required. What is happening is that we are fixing installations and a couple of days or weeks later those installations have been sabotaged, looted or whatever, and we have to go back, and that brings additional costs and a certain level of frustration. Q: And what about the situation with the Oil-for-Food Programme being wound up? You mentioned people are dependent on aid - what will happen afterwards? Are people going to be able to cope, especially given the fact that 60 percent of the population are dependent on rations? A: I think there is a misconception out there - what the World Food Programme (WFP) calls the public distribution system, and the Iraqis always called, since its inception, the monthly food entitlement, was put in place prior to the existence of the Oil-for-Food Programme. What was happening was, as national reserves dwindled during the period of sanctions, that entitlement shrunk over time and it was pretty low at the time the Security Council passed Resolution 986. But it already existed - the system was there. The system was beefed up because suddenly there were additional resources allowing the importation of additional food items. So the Oil-for-Food Programme will close on 21 November but the system can remain there for as long as the Iraqi interim administration or the future elected government of Iraq deems it necessary to keep that safety net. But one has to keep in mind that the safety net in its present form and shape is an aberration resulting from the sanction regime. Q: Will WFP continue to be involved? A: Not necessarily. The system was ably and professionally run by Iraqis - by Iraqis working in the Ministry of Trade. WFP has a prominent role at the moment in assisting the Ministry Of Trade to bring back the system - because it was disrupted by the conflict, not all the commodities were in the country and so on. That is the role WFP plays in the present conflict. WFP envisages phasing out that role by some time in October - even before 21 November - because the Iraqis are absolutely able to run the show. Q: Do you think the Iraqi population is clear enough about the UN role here and the fact that it is different from the Coalition? A: No - that has been a weakness which we need to address. Particularly because the UN has, in the minds of Iraqis, a mixed record in Iraq. Overall I would say there is a credibility gap that we need to fill. We fill that credibility gap by supporting Iraqis doing what they think is needed today, in the medium and, hopefully, the long term. Q: What practical ways can you use to explain your role to the population? A: It has to be managed through the national and local press, by working closely with representative municipal councils, local councils and leadership committees. I think that is the only way. Q: What is the future of your office - the United Nations Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq - or UNOCHI? A: UNOCHI as a name I don’t know, but my office basically has two functions. One is the termination of the Oil-for-Food Programme and the phasing out of UN involvement in related activities. And that portion of my functions, I hope, will be disappearing on 21 November, because that will mean we have been successful, in an orderly fashion, in transferring those responsibilities. Our other functions are the more traditional humanitarian coordination functions. Those functions, within the scope of the revised humanitarian appeal, are relevant at least until 31 December, and we will find out some time later in the year how those functions have been performed.