IRIN Interview with Abel Chivukuvuku

The conflict in Angola allows few political figures to maintain their independence. However, Abel Chivukuvuku, a former political adviser to rebel UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, insists that he is one such individual. A Luanda-based UNITA member of parliament, he has avoided the government-created UNITA-Renovada faction, while at the same time maintaining some political distance from Savimbi. In the following interview with IRIN, Chivukuvuku calls for the United Nations and Angolan government to create the conditions to promote peace talks, and suggests a time table for a peace process that could start within two months. He believes that Savimbi must initially be "helped" to overcome his mistrust, and could later consider retiring from active politics. However, central to a solution to Angola's 27 years of civil war, must be the realisation that there cannot be a military solution to the country's troubles, and he rejects the government's "two-track approach" of offering dialogue while maintaining military pressure on UNITA. QUESTION: Something seems to be happening in Angola at the moment. We have the UN saying they would like to open talks with UNITA and the Angolan government saying they are not opposed to that. ANSWER: I have mixed feelings ... The Angolan conflict has its root causes in political issues, so to solve them there must be a political solution. Yes, there are indications that the government is giving a green light to the UN for contact with Savimbi, but I think that there is not yet enough will within government circles to really achieve a balanced, positive and serious solution. This is proved by the two-track approach they have. At the same time they give the green light to the UN they pursue the military approach, and in the "Futungo" presidency circles, there is a kind of resurgent radical militaristic belief that they can win the war ... You cannot search for a positive and balanced political solution when at the same time you go after your opponent, personally persecuting him. You cannot have a balanced position when you still have an arrest warrant against the person [you are supposed to talk to]. You cannot find a positive political solution when you are trying to convince your regional partners to give your opponent, with whom you want to find a political solution, the epithet of terrorist ... Also I think that despite this opening one does not see enough action being taken by the UN Secretariat and by the UN Security Council. Everyone expected that with this opening the government has given to the UN Secretary-General, the UN Security Council should at least have taken two actions. One: to give full backing to the Secretary-General and [Special Envoy Ibrahim] Gambari to conduct a real approach to UNITA. Second: everyone expected, and this is a prerequisite for serious talks, the Security Council would lift certain categories of sanctions on UNITA, especially those regarding travel and contacts. I think these sanctions should be lifted, especially because if the whole rationale of sanctions was to force or lure UNITA to a political solution, you have to make such a solution possible. And one of the elements is to allow people to be reachable, to be in touch with those that can help the process. I think at that level the Security Council is going too slowly. Q: Or maybe the point is the question of whether UNITA is committed to the peace process because ... A: I will come to that point. I do also think that yes, Dr Savimbi and UNITA have stated several times they are ready to enter into a political dialogue. They have stated several times they accept the Lusaka Protocol [the moribund 1994 peace agreement], although it needs to be updated. But I think due to the political actions and military actions of the government, UNITA and Dr Savimbi have become too mistrustful and too fearful. So they have been unable to [promote] more clearly stated political positions ... to the international community that would be the basis of a solution. At some time I believe the radicals in the [ruling] MPLA will come to the conclusion that their dream is not realisable. I believe that eventually UNITA will evolve to the point of being more attractive in terms of their positions so people do believe there is seriousness and willingness. And also I believe there is a point at which the UN will have to either take up these initiatives or measures or else it will become irrelevant [to the Angolan process]. Q: The problem seems to be that there needs to be some sign of good faith from Savimbi, surely? He said recently that there would be no ceasefire ... A: It's a little bit difficult in a war of two sides to say that one of the sides has to stop. It is true that one of the sides could state willingness to stop if there is reciprocity. Meaning, one could say fine, by 13 March I am ready to stop if the other side is also ready to stop so that we advance to a political solution. I think that at this time no side has been willing to state clearly that position. One has to recognise that there cannot be a unilateral ceasefire in Angola, there has to be a bilateral ceasefire. Dr Savimbi has already stated that he's ready to talk and he accepts the Lusaka Protocol. There is, yes, mistrust in the international community and certain MPLA circles about [his] seriousness ... But the issue is now that we need to convince the government that there will never be a military solution. And also we need to help our fellows in UNITA to overcome the mistrust and fear and then advance to positive political solutions or ideas and at the same time try and convince the UN Security Council to take some measures - I think these elements should be the necessary steps to have a peace process this year, at least in this first semester. Q: When you say there needs to be changes to the Lusaka Protocol, what changes would you suggest? A: In the Lusaka Protocol the military issue was addressed as demilitarisation, surrendering UNITA weapons and demilitarisation, coupled with re-incorporation of some selected military elements. I think that this concept has to be upgraded and adopt a different approach which should be global incorporation coupled with a progressive reduction of troops. What do I mean? When we tried to apply the Lusaka Protocol we had problems that not all UNITA troops could fit into the new national armed forces. I can give an example. We presented a list of 70 officers with the rank of Brigadier-General, and the government already had 200 at this rank. They could not absorb the 70 and decided to only absorb nine. Then where would the other 61 officers go? So I think the best solution is let us have a swollen army but everyone gets in, with their ranks and honours. Yes the country will expend some money, but it's better to spend by incorporating people than spend it on the continuation of the war. [This concept should be coupled with] a 10 year process of conditional reduction, meaning the troops will be released into normal life after receiving professional training while still in the military and laid off according to job placements. As far as top officers are concerned, there could be a programme of credits or loans to start a new life ... I think another element is - I don't know whether it can be within the Lusaka Protocol upgrading or constitutional discussions - but I think there should be a serious national debate on the nature of the state we want to establish in Angola. Should we continue with this excessively centralised, excessively clientist state that we have, or should we establish a more balanced and decentralised kind of structure which would give local authorities some real power over local issues? We need to discuss if it can fit with the solution of the conflict or if it can be taken as a concurrent national debate ... I think there is another area that needs to be upgraded, the concept of national reconciliation. The Lusaka Protocol views it as just getting a [government of national unity] and that's national reconciliation. I think national reconciliation is a larger concept. It does not only imply reconciliation between MPLA and UNITA. It implies reconciliation of the whole Angolan family, with all other segments of society that have also suffered from the war. Q: How many UNITAs are there? There is UNITA-Renovada, UNITA in the bush, people like yourself ... A: There are those that believe that what is happening to UNITA is tragic and very bad. I'm one of those who believe that is not necessarily so. I think this is a process of maturing in which there are several different positions and views ... If UNITA wants to play a role it will have to reconcile itself. You cannot be a serious player in reconciling the larger Angolan family if you don't succeed in reconciling your own particular family ... I think Dr Savimbi has a great role to play. It's up to him to determine what legacy he wants to leave in the future. I think he can leave positive imprints if he wishes to, but also he may leave negative imprints if he decides to. All of us will need to help him overcome certain difficulties so as to be able to be a positive player in helping Angola reach peace and reconcile itself ... I do believe that Dr Savimbi could really do some very positive things and eventually think about letting this [political career] go as too much trouble. Q: You talked of reconciliation in UNITA. Does that mean other people emerging and maybe Savimbi playing a figurehead role? A: I think in the current situation it is necessary that Dr Savimbi plays a full role to find a solution and we in UNITA need to help him establish that political base for a solution and a political legacy, and then it's up to him later. I think that we need him to solve the problems and it's up to him to decide whether he should go beyond that or whether he could leave that as his political legacy. Q: The political leadership can be brought into the peace process but how about an individual UNITA commander, say, who is making money out of smuggling diamonds for instance. How do you reclaim these people? A: I think there can be reluctance, there can be [hiccups in the process] but it will not be decisive. With UNITA if people deal positively with Savimbi things can be solved. Within the MPLA the one who matters is President [Jose Eduardo] dos Santos. Q: If elections go ahead as planned by the government what does it mean for peace? A: I think it depends on what the process will be. Do you have an election before peace? Are serious, positive elections feasible in a war situation? Or, should we strike peace for instance this year and have elections two years later as I said earlier? I expect elections to happen for instance by 2004. Then why don't we do peace in 2002, prepare for elections in 2003 and have elections in 2004? This could be the best schedule. Q: How quickly can peace happen? A: Providing President Dos Santos wants it and Dr Savimbi wants it, peace can happen in two months, three months or four months. Q: There has been talk of South Africa and maybe Nigeria playing a role behind the scenes in urging both parties to negotiations. Can there be a major role for these countries in the peace process? A: There is talk of South Africa, about Nigeria, although I think with South Africa they cannot be the broker. They can be a supporter to the broker, but not the broker itself. I think there is not enough trust between Pretoria and Luanda. There are elements within Luanda who see Pretoria closer to UNITA than to Luanda. There is also a kind of illusion of competition between Angola and South Africa as far as the region is concerned. I think such individuals have never analysed that Angola does not have the ability to be a competitor in the current circumstances ... I think Nigeria is too far, it doesn't feel enough of the problems of Angola like South Africa feels ... It has too many problems in its own backyard to deal with to be able to concentrate energy on this kind of endeavour. The UN could be a good broker but the problem comes with the Security Council [and alleged business interests of its members in Angola]. There are some countries which have shown some kind of commitment to Angola like Canada or Norway for instance. These two countries have shown a huge commitment and also have the advantage of not having economic interests in Angola. In my view these are the kind of brokers.