Interview with UNDP official on reconstruction

Over 200 participants have signed up for a three-day conference on Afghanistan's reconstruction, due to be held in the Pakistani capital, Islamabad, on the 27 November and co-hosted by the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Asian Development Bank. In a press conference in New York on Monday, the UNDP head, Mark Malloch-Brown, said the international system was poised for a major effort, and pledged quick action for early recovery efforts. The conference is expected to move plans for rehabilitation and reconstruction of Afghanistan to a new level. UNDP's Senior Deputy Resident Representative for Afghanistan, Knut Ostby, told IRIN that one of the greater challenges facing the reconstruction partners would be developing a process to enable rehabilitation to start immediately, while remaining responsive to the needs of Afghans and aims of a future government. QUESTION: What is UNDP’s strategy? Does it follow the classic phases of relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction and development? ANSWER: First of all, to think in these stages is not helpful. We need to think about these phases in parallel, and there are certain elements that will have to wait for a recognised government. Many activities need to start from day one, bearing in mind the current situation and the last 23 years of [Afghan] history. A whole generation has grown up without development assistance and tried to make do with available resources through a community based approach, in the absence of a central government. There is a need to act immediately. [Special Representative] Lakhdar Brahimi said recently we cannot hold up reconstruction while we wait for a stable government, because participation and reconstruction will provide Afghans with an incentive to move from war to peace. The more activities that we can start now will help to stabilise the situation. Economic activities can also give employment to large numbers of people who are currently engaged in criminality and war. Q: So you're proposing that the combatants would abandon their weapons if given economic alternatives? A: Creating a peace economy as soon as possible is the objective. This will not happen by only having agencies like WFP [World Food Programme] working in Afghanistan and UNDP coming in six months later. We are basically trying to look at two options. One, we will scale current activities dramatically with the resources available. We have a good base to start from, and we'll try to move from pure community-based activities to other noncontroversial recovery activities. Then, in parallel to that, we will start planning for more large-scale reconstruction, which will first involve the identification of needs and processes. Brahimi said that we have to ensure a broad-based Afghan involvement until a central government is properly organised, when there is a counter-part to help decide priorities. We are also planning some quick impact projects, as we did in Kosovo. Q: Do you see something like a Marshall Plan for Afghanistan? A: I think the international community has a huge dilemma here. It is extremely urgent to do as much recovery as possible. That involves planning, but at the same time, empowering the future administration of Afghanistan to take the lead. The Marshall Plan for Europe was a bilateral relationship between the US government and the governments in the affected countries. That would be ideal for Afghanistan, but [in the absence of a government] we will have to take another approach. While a direct copy of the Marshall Plan is not appropriate, I think we need to conduct some interim activities, while at the same time identify what needs to be done for a future government to take on. We can do a lot in terms of recovery now, but we have to emphasise the need for broad Afghan support for the longer-term reconstruction and sustainable development programmes. No matter how much money is received from outside, it is the Afghans who will have to rebuild the country. They have to take responsibility. Building dams where they are not needed, or spending a lot of money in a project that's not needed will be a waste. We need Afghans to answer these questions, and it cannot be done by bunch of planners sitting in Islamabad. Q: Are you concerned about Afghans not being properly consulted and the international community creating white elephants? A: I am very concerned that can happen. There is a big dilemma. As I said, we can't wait for a government to be in place and then do the reconstruction. Afghans need it to be done immediately. At the same time, we need to do everything possible to avoid pre-empting or undermining any future government by taking too many decisions from the outside. So the international community has to be responsible and find that balance. This will be difficult, but is our responsibility to find it. It will require discipline and coordination. Fortunately we already have some process in place to help, such as this conference planned at the end of November with the Asia Development Bank, the World Bank and UNDP. This is meant to pull together a large number of people, including many Afghans, to discuss what is needed in terms of immediate and longer-term recovery and reconstruction. Q: How does the UNDP role fit with your partners - the World Bank and Asian Development Bank? A: The typical role of the World Bank is to assist a government in large-scale investment and reconstruction, whereas UNDP's typical role will be to assist the government in more human related areas, including the rebuilding of its government system. UNDP would also be expected to be a partner for future [development] activities. This is the role we are trying to fill while we are waiting for a new government to come in. Q: Is there a capacity problem [for recovery assistance] in Afghanistan? A: There will be a huge absorption-capacity problem. There has been an enormous brain drain of Afghans, as well as a great lack of training for the past 23 years. Even before that, Afghan poverty and illiteracy was high. Putting in large numbers of international experts may solve the immediate problems on the surface, but it doesn't help in the long term. For example, imagine we want to have a fully functioning ministry of health that can develop master plans for health delivery systems in Afghanistan. So one solution is that we import a few thousand people from other countries to run the whole ministry and implement this. But then, after a while, you realise that there are no Afghans able to take charge of the health system, the internationals leave, and Afghanistan is back to square one. We don't have a perfect solution to this, but it's our obligation to find the right balance. We at least will try to empower the Afghans to make their choices.