What’s Unsaid | Should we talk to the jihadists?

Obi Anyadike

Today on What’s Unsaid: Should we talk to the jihadists?

For over a decade, Sahelian armies and their foreign backers have battled jihadist insurgencies – and are losing. 

Laura Berlingozzi

These groups don't just aim at seizing territory. They seek to replace the secular state with a different political order. One that wishes to enforce strict interpretations of Sharia that go against liberal democratic ideals of most Western countries.

Anyadike

Groups that self-identify as jihadists - like the so-called Islamic State in the Greater Sahara and Jama'at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen - or JNIM - have expanded their control over territory and populations, while the credibility of governments in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger - and their militaries’ human rights records – have suffered. 

Berlingozzi

There have been mass atrocities committed by the armies of the three states, so violence against civilians has actually worsened, while at the same time, jihadist insurgencies have not diminished their grasp. So, this approach has not worked.

Anyadike

With the humanitarian toll rising. Some eight million people have been forced from their homes in the region. Is it time to start to think about a political solution, and to begin talking with the jihadists?

Berlingozzi

As the saying goes, you cannot kill your way out of conflict. So, as much of the West is out of the picture in the Sahel, maybe it would be time to move beyond this dichotomy of friend and enemy, good guys, bad guys.

Anyadike

Laura Berlingozzi’s research focuses on peace and conflict in the Sahel, with a particular emphasis on the dynamics of jihadist insurgencies and the gendered dimensions of violence and security. She has just written a hard-hitting opinion piece for The New Humanitarian which explores the beginnings, a few years ago, of a dialogue process – and the current opposition to talks by the new military juntas in the Sahel.

Berlingozzi

I don't have empirical certainty, but there might be, also, an openness - a timid openness - of the juntas, for dialogue. It will be difficult to justify engaging with jihadist groups at the political level, but there might be an openness. Let's see.

Anyadike

This is What’s Unsaid. A bi-weekly podcast by The New Humanitarian where we explore open secrets and uncomfortable conversations around the world’s conflicts and disasters. My name is Obi Anyadike, staff editor at The New Humanitarian. 

On today’s episode: Should we talk to the jihadists?

With us today is Laura Berlingozzi. She’s a Postdoctoral researcher in International relations at the Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies in Pisa, Italy. I started by asking her why governments tend to treat armed Islamist militants more negatively than other insurgent groups.

Berlingozzi  

I think it's important to recognise that this perspective is rooted in both moral outrage and strategic calculations, like when we analyse this group, like JNIM, which is the al-Qaeda-affiliated group in the Sahel or IS-affiliated groups like the Islamic State Greater Sahara, as it was once called, now reframed as IS-Sahel province, have committed atrocities in the past: public executions, forced amputations. Plus, these groups are part of a transnational network, linked ideologically and sometimes operationally to al-Qaeda or the Islamic State, which makes negotiating with them particularly fraught for international actors, because in their view, it risks legitimising not just a local rebellion, but a global ideological movement that threatens the security of Western nations as well. And, it has to be stressed here that these movements are local insurgencies, and do not represent a threat, as there have been no acts committed on American or European soil that you could trace back to Mali or Niger. So, the very idea that dialogue with jihadist groups is a taboo is rooted in the saying ‘We do not negotiate with terrorists,’ which is the rhetoric that emerged after the 9/11 era, under the Bush administration narrative and the War on Terror rhetoric that then followed for two decades. It's difficult to see jihadist groups as actors with whom to negotiate, because giving them the legitimacy of being understood as political actors with a political goal - which they actually are - they are framed like the enemy, understood as beyond any possibility of dialogue. But yet, this is where things get a little bit blurry, right? Because despite this rhetoric and violent behaviour, these groups adapt to local context, so they blend the global jihadist ideology with local grievances. And many fighters join, not because they dream [of] a global caliphate, or not because they dream what we have often heard - virgins - but because the jihadist groups offer better alternatives to corrupt and absent government. So, they administer justice. They deliver service to local communities where the state is absent. It's very daunting for governments, because if they negotiate with them, they fear that this would validate their tactics and undermine, also state legitimacy, right? So, I interviewed a member of the security and defence forces, and he told me: If you talk to jihadists, you risk admitting that the state has failed to provide basic security, which would be a dangerous admission in Sahelian countries. 

Anyadike

There's been a long-standing debate over the types of jihadist groups, whether they are local - based on local grievances - or transnational, with a much more global frame. Does that make a difference in terms of what we see on the ground, and in particular, does it have a bearing on the potential for dialogue?

Berlingozzi 

Yes. I think it's more nuanced than this black and white dichotomy, right? So, probably the answer lies in between. Having said this, there are differences between Islamic State-affiliated groups and al-Qaeda-affiliated groups. So, for instance, the Islamic State has been generally more hostile to dialogue. Its former leader, Abu Walid al-Sahrawi explicitly condemned JNIM - the al-Qaeda-affiliated group - for considering talks with infidels, and accused JNIM of betraying the global jihadist cause by engaging in local peace processes. So, there is the idea that ISGS command structure is a lot more centralised and less adapted to local conditions, compared to JNIM, and while ISGS has been more reliant on harsh measures and violence to establish control quickly, punishments and public execution, to enforce its rule, contrary to this JNIM - so the al-Qaeda-affiliated group - has had a more population-centric kind of approach. And why? Partly because JNIM leadership, the group leader, Iyad ag Ghali, and the leader of the most important Katiba - the most important group in the centre of Mali - Amadou Koufa, come from the local ethnic groups, which means that they have stronger connection to local communities - Touareg groups and Fulani groups in the centre - which makes them more receptive to understanding local context, and governance in the territories.

Anyadike 

Some of the grievances that communities have, and I'm thinking particularly about the ethnic dimension in central Mali, for example, and in much of the Sahel, around the Peul or the Fulani ethnic group, these are issues that jihadists gravitate towards, politicise. Can you tell us a little bit more about that?

Berlingozzi  

Yeah, yeah, yeah, Obi, you are completely right. There is an ethnicity factor underlying all of this. It's true that at the heart of many jihadist movements in the Sahel, there are deep-seated ethnic grievances, and failure to regulate conflicts over access to natural resources between farmers and herders. Sometimes traditional conflict resolution mechanisms between farmers and herders do not work anymore, and this is also why some communities - take me with a pinch of salt - but some communities actually prefer jihadi governance, because the introduction of the kadi - of Sharia and Islamic judges that will judge over disputes, over access to land, if animals are stolen - and this kind of Islamic justice is a lot less corrupt, more timely, and - in a way - since there can be also punitive measures, so it's more likely that it will actually be enforced, compared to the former state justice, which was either absent or corrupt. Definitely, one aspect concerns the regulation on access to natural resources, and also on the other hand, of course, there is a big problem concerning specific groups like the Fulani herders in central Mali. For centuries, these communities have been marginalised, politically and economically, excluded from power structures dominated by ethnic groups like the Bambara or the Dogon. And this exclusion, it's true that it made them fertile ground for jihadist recruitment. As in the narrative, they've also positioned themselves as protector of the marginalised. And, this dynamic is not just ancient history. It's really about land, water and survival, and Fulani herders have found themselves increasingly squeezed by expanding agriculture, by the farmers, and corrupt resource management, and also of state forces that have increasingly targeted the Fulani community, failing to distinguish between armed jihadists and ordinary herders, and for them, it's not about ideology. We're not talking about religious radicalisation. We are talking about security, survival, and basically, protecting their communities and dignity.

Anyadike  

But let me just ask you this, the military governments in the Sahel seem to have turned their back on what was the beginnings of a dialogue process. Why do you think they've done that? Why do you think the three military juntas, broadly, have stopped any dialogue process?

Berlingozzi 

The military junta said that one of the main reasons for the coup in Niger has been the failure of the previous democratically-elected president Bazoum to deal with jihadist insurgency spreading in the country. The justification has also been that, in Niger, for instance, Bazoum opted for an approach called ‘Outstretched Hands.’ So, actually engaging with jihadists, talking directly with local leaders, releasing prisoners in exchange for hostages, and with this openness to dialogue. So, then when juntas came to power - being military, they do what military do. That is, sort of, close the doors on these softer approaches towards jihadist insurgencies, trying to project their image as the guarantor of order, security and stability. Then, what actually happened on the ground is that the security situation has actually worsened, and in Burkina Faso, it has actually worsened so much that two-thirds of the country are in the hands of jihadist groups. In the centre of Mali, Northern Mali, to a great extent, the state has no control, and maybe there is less reporting from the ground, because journalists are impeded from working. So, the numbers there, of victims can be shaky, but the military approach, we have seen - with empirical fact - that it does not work.

Anyadike 

At the hyper-local level, we have seen peace pacts between primarily JNIM and communities, and there's a multiplicity of peace arrangements. Traditional authorities negotiate with jihadist groups. There's an imbalance in terms of power, which can skew what those peace agreements look like. But, if we're talking about negotiating with jihadists, how then do we get from the local level to the national level? And, if we really are talking about a dialogue process to end the violence, to find a political solution, that seems to throw up a whole bunch of other issues. Obviously, there's a domestic political issue, and there's an external dimension as well, as we've seen that France has played a role in trying to stem some of those peace processes. Can you explain a little bit more on those issues? 

Berlingozzi 

Yeah, it's complicated. Local agreements work exactly because they are very, very local, and they are based on an informal understanding, which also is one of the reasons why they're so fragile. For instance, if there is a power shift, if the dynamics on the ground shift, if new fighters arrive, then those local agreements can be broken. So, it's very difficult to translate this at the very national level. For instance, France has always been opposed to the idea of dialogue. Also Russia, and other international powers have had their own agendas, pushing more for military solutions rather than dialogue. This is a critical point, because, of course, external forces can disrupt local peace efforts just as easily as they can support them. And then, the state. The state can act as the main spoiler. And the red lines that are specified by the state and the jihadist groups are clear. For the state, there is no negotiation on the form of government, so that the Malian state should remain a secular state, while jihadist groups want to impose Sharia law. These two goals seem irreconcilable, right? And, at the national level, in the case of Mali, for instance, you understand how much the question of dialogue is political, because a recent declaration said that JNIM would be open to dialogue with Tuareg rebels in the north. There could be an instance where Tuareg rebels, former rebels, and al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in the north of Mali - where the state is almost absent - sign a pact where in the north of the country, the Tuareg rebel accept the application of Sharia law, which is something that JNIM wants, and JNIM accept that the Tuareg rebel, the FLA, can elect local representative, and administer the territory. So, if this pact between Tuareg rebels and JNIM fighters would actually happen, it would be a big issue for the Malian government, because it would basically mean losing control completely of the northern of the country, which means that then the state lately, might seem more open to the idea of talking with jihadists. Let's use a little bit our imagination. Mauritania actually successfully engaged in a process of religious dialogue with jihadist prisoners that was not just aimed at deradicalising them, but also at understanding their motivations and grievances, and succeeded in reducing the jihadist threats in the country. So, could there be another state in the Sahel that might incorporate - like Mauritania - some elements of Sharia law? Nah. From my interviews, it seemed that the application of Sharia law is seen as non-negotiable by the state.

Anyadike  

But just to pick up on that though. In a number of Sahelian countries, Mali, for example, people don't really have a problem, to a large extent, with Sharia law. The question is, would they want Sharia law as imposed by the jihadists? Can we switch it around a little bit and look from the perspective of jihadist groups? And I'm thinking now about HTS in Syria. We sometimes think of them as implacable, maximalist. They don't change, but sometimes political currents seem to affect them as well. They have to have a political antenna. Can that lead to shifts in those red lines? Can they make them a little bit more pink than red and absolute?

Berlingozzi  

Absolutely, absolutely, those red lines can definitely become pinkish. And, recently, in one of the declaration of JNIM, it has become apparent that the model is not so much so Mauritania within [the] region, nor Algeria as well, that also underwent a dialogue programme, but could rather be Syria. And, the Syrian example constitutes something that could be very interesting for JNIM, that is becoming true political actors, also in the eye of the government, by basically distancing itself from al-Qaeda, and then the question would be, what the government would do then. What happens when JNIM actually decides to sever the ties with al-Qaeda and would then become a legitimate actor with whom to talk if they follow the same trajectory of HTS? I think this is a very scary scenario for the government, but this is just a matter of our imagination.

Anyadike

Yeah, we're speculating. We're speculating, though I've often heard in parts of northern Nigeria that politically Boko Haram is okay. We just hate the violence. 

Berlingozzi 

Yeah.

Anyadike

The ideology is fine, but the killing, we can't cope with that. But, just back to something that you said. You thought you had a sense some of the military regimes are beginning to rethink the idea of dialogue. What was that feeling based on?

Berlingozzi  

Yeah, it's true that in the past ten years, local juntas have not regained one centimetre of ground that they previously lost. So, there have been rumours, and as a scientist, I shouldn't frame my analysis and my understandings of reality based on rumours and very, very preliminary findings of my research that… also juntas are not completely stupid, which means that they might start to be aware that the numbers speak from themselves, and the violence has not stopped. The violence towards soldiers is increasing. They are basically losing in this game, so it's possible that they have good counsellors that started saying: Yeah, maybe we should reconsider our approach? And, I would guess and again, speculate - and something that scientists shouldn't do - but I would guess that the first step would be everything that is tracked to diplomacy, back-channeling and secret negotiations, without actually compromising their public image towards the local population, because so far, they have said: We will strike hard until the very last terrorist is standing. So, changing narrative is complicated, but since they want to see results, in order to maintain power, because on the back of all this conversation of today, of course, is the question of power. Jihadist insurgency wants to enforce their power and control over territories. At the same time, juntas - we've seen the Malian junta that just procrastinated and postponed their - they dissolved political parties and there will not be an election. They want to stay in power for the next five years, still. And, if the population would start to see actually, it's not going exactly how they promised, there might be some issues there. 

Anyadike 

Here's a final hypothesis, which I know you hate, but let's think about this. Just assume that one of these jihadist groups, actually took the capital, defeated the government. What would be the repercussions of that? How seismic would that be? You know, we saw the Taliban, extremely repressive in their first incarnation. The second one, I'm not sure how repressive they are, but certainly they initially said that we've learnt our lessons. Have jihadist groups in the Sahel looked at these examples? Do you think that they're also thinking about, if we took power, maybe we would have to be much more politically astute than we are in opposition. When in opposition, we can just, you know, say we oppose everything. But, actually governing might be a kind of a new kind of discipline, which might change their outlook and how they behave. 

Berlingozzi 

Okay, Obi, you're really pushing me over the limits of speculation, but it's a very interesting question, and JNIM has already said, has reportedly drawn lessons from other insurgencies, including the Taliban negotiation with the US. When you were talking I didn't actually think about jihadist insurgencies, I was thinking about Meloni's government, so our far-right government that has been in opposition for a very, very long time, and then while stepping into government, they had to assume, let's say, a less far, far-right-wing approach which they haven't really succeeded in doing, and so really like sort of polishing their image, and become a more digestible governing force, which is something that all armed groups that then go into politics, like the FARC, for instance, at some point, they have to have to manage, right? They have to polish their image, and they have to come to terms with the political arena and the political agenda and the political process itself. So, would the Taliban be an example, or would HTS in Syria be an example? You know, recently, JNIM made a major attack in the capital city, Bamako. They attacked the airport and they attacked a military base. JNIM didn't attack the capital since a very long time. So, the question is, could they actually take Bamako? Could they take Niamey? And Ouaga? Now that they are just surrounding all the capitals, could they do that? Now that the Americans are out, the French are out, and Russians mostly drink vodka. So, could they do that? Yes, the answer is, I think they would have the capabilities to do that. The attack to Bamako was a signal to the states that said clearly and loud: Hey, be careful. If we want, we can. And, it's true there have been reports of the insurgency encircling Niamey and Bamako. They're there. They're in the city. And, I don't think, even given the Russians presence, I don't think it would be super complicated to take the capitals. Do they want to do that? No. My very humble and possibly wrong and stupid opinion is that, they would rather control the areas where they are now, and keep their territories with a stable governance in the central Mali, in the north of Mali, in the tri-border region, in northern Nigeria. Because, of course, governing is completely something different.

Anyadike

Laura, thank you so much for joining us on the podcast. It was really eye-opening. Really appreciate it. 

Berlingozzi 

Thank you so much for having me.

Anyadike

Laura Berlingozzi is a Postdoctoral researcher in International Relations at the Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies in Pisa, Italy. 

What are people afraid to talk about in today’s crises? What needs to be discussed openly? Let us know by sending an email to [email protected]. And subscribe to The New Humanitarian on your podcast app for more episodes of What’s Unsaid – a podcast about open secrets and uncomfortable truths. Hosted by Ali Latifi, and me. 

This episode is produced and edited by Freddie Boswell, sound engineering by Tevin Sudi, with original music by Whitney Patterson, and hosted by me – Obi Anyadike. Thanks for listening!