Awaiting peace in the southern region

Dressed in full traditional attire, Shilluk Kingdom's paramount chief, Edward Amum, sat in front of his house in Malakal and wryly listened to the sounds of drums and an occasional trumpet that wafted through the dry air. It was 25 February. Malakal, a town in southern Sudan's Upper Nile State, was in party mode as residents turned out for belated celebrations to commemorate the 9 January signing in Nairobi, Kenya, of the comprehensive peace accord between the government of Sudan and the southern Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). "We are both very far and very near [to peace]," Amum told IRIN, as he contemplated the prospects for peace after the Nairobi accord. A traditional chief of an area across the river from Malakal, he fled the fighting that erupted there in early 2004 and has since lived in the town. His son, Pagan Amum, is the Secretary-General of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) - a coalition of Sudanese political opposition parties - and a senior figure in the SPLM/A. Despite Amum's scepticism, reports of the signing of the Nairobi accord were received with joy and relief in Malakal - a town situated on the banks of the River Nile between government and SPLM/A-controlled areas. A military stronghold for the government, Malakal is inhabited mainly by people of Dinka, Nuer and Shilluk ethinicity. Local residents said no immediate impact of the peace agreement was as yet visible. It was not possible to get comment from the governor, Dak Doub. On the other hand, daily rumours of fighting nearby had continued to make people uneasy. To make matters worse, a 6:00 p.m. [15.00 GMT] curfew was in place. "The Nairobi peace agreement is a good thing, but the problem is, we do not trust it as the trust between the UDF [United Democratic Front, whose predecessor, the UDSF, was a party to the 1997 Khartoum Agreement] and the government has been broken," Bol Loth Jok, chairman of the UDF in Greater Upper Nile, told IRIN on 23 February. "It looks good on paper and everybody in Upper Nile celebrated the peace agreement, but we hope it will be implemented," he added. After the 1997 Khartoum Agreement between the Sudanese government and the South Sudan Defense Force (SSDF) and a number of political groups in Upper Nile, many people expected a referendum on southern independence to follow, but it never materialised. Many in the region remain suspicious about Khartoum's intensions. "If they [the government] get a chance to get out of it, they will," Peter Kun, Malakal chairman of the Union of Sudan African Parties (USAP), also a party to the 1997 Khartoum agreement, told IRIN, saying the government had signed the agreement under international pressure. William Adieng, representative of the Shilluk King, speaking in his personal capacity, felt that the peace agreement had a better chance to survive than previous ones because "many minds have been put to it and it is internationally supported". He added: "Our people have been longing for this peace for a very long time and support the parties to the agreement. The makers of peace are the children of God." Militia problems Upper Nile is potentially the main oil-producing region in Sudan. The region, however, is largely secured not by the regular army, but by southern militias, predominantly Nuer, whose allegiance to Khartoum has been a source of much instability in Upper Nile, compared with other regions in southern Sudan. A Sudanese government official said they were worried about the militias. "It is easy to arm local groups," Peter Pal, deputy-commissioner of the government's Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) in Malakal, told IRIN on 28 February. "They were armed by both the government and the SPLM/A, but now they form a real security problem in the region." Another source, a local political analyst added: "A big impediment to the consolidation of peace was the presence of many government-aligned local militias who did not get paid and had to live off the local population to sustain themselves, bringing considerable misery in their wake." The majority of the militias in Upper Nile consist of men from the Nuer. The groups have had historic rivalries with the largest ethnic group in southern Sudan, the Dinka, and among themselves. The rivalries have, over the years of conflict, been exploited politically. "The government is ruining our peace agreement through our own people by letting them fight against themselves," Amum said. "People are being pushed and paid to ruin the peace - it is not a tribal problem." The political analyst added: "The government often labels the militia fights as a tribal war, portraying it as something that has long historic roots and is inevitable. Sometimes this is true, but at other times the government, through its militias, directs the fighting itself." The picture is further complicated by the fact that in certain regions many civilians were armed to operate as community vigilantes. They are not affiliated to any of the parties and are answerable only to their traditional elders and chiefs. Ongoing Hostilities Throughout the month of February, fighting continued between rival Nuer-tribes in Doma, a town close to Nasir, east of Malakal. It was during the dry season that the Lou Nuer often drive their cattle to the Sobat River and come into conflict with Jikany Nuer, who claim the Sobat as their own. "Although this conflict is not related to the wider north-south conflict, it is a source of instability in the region and the widespread availability of firearms has exacerbated the scope of these seasonal clashes," a humanitarian source told IRIN in Malakal. On 17 February, for example, fighting broke out when militias attacked Akobo, a town close to Nasir and the Ethiopian border. According to sources, the militias were reportedly under the command of Taban Juoc, who was recently promoted to the rank of brigadier by the government. "Taban is the commissioner of Akobo, but he lives in Nasir and is like a minister without portfolio," the source said. "He lacks local support and the town has been controlled by the SPLM/A for a considerable time." The SPLM/A retook Akobo on 20 February. On 22 February, fighting again erupted when government-allied militias in Akoka, a town north of Malakal, defected to the SPLM/A but refused to give up the town, which the government considers its territory. This triggered off an offensive by SSDF militia that remained loyal to Khartoum. Unfounded reports too have complicated the situation. On 23 February, reports of militia movements in SPLM/A-controlled areas across the Nile from Malakal triggered a fresh influx of IDPs [internally displaced persons] from the Shilluk Kingdom. Many of the IDPs had just returned to their villages after a series of raids in the first months of 2004 prompted them to seek refuge in Malakal. It turned out that the troop movements were not offensive. Disarmament Challenge The UN has proposed deploying peacekeepers in the Sudan, but the challenge of disarming the southern militias remains daunting. While the Machakos Protocol of the peace agreement recognises only government and SPLM/A forces, the militias would have to be disarmed or absorbed by either of the two armies. "The groups in Upper Nile have not been disarmed yet and it is important that the UN comes down as soon as possible to control the situation," Galuak Liphoth, deputy secretary for security affairs of the SPLM/A in Malakal, told IRIN. The government, on its part, has started to integrate militia fighters into their own ranks and as many as 300 SSDF militia commanders were recently promoted to high-ranking officers in the Sudanese army. "They are now wearing military uniforms and receive a government salary, reducing the incentive for raids against the civilian population," a source said. However, it is neither likely that the government would completely absorb the SSDF militias into its regular army, or that the militia would be willing to go up north during the transitional period. This is when control over this part of Upper Nile will be transferred to the SPLM/A leaving the SSDF in a state of limbo during the transitional period. "They are southerners and most likely to remain in the south," a source said. "If they retain their allegiance to the government, they will form a real problem for SPLM/A authority in the south." The low-ranking militia fighters, who did most of the fighting, were not being integrated into the government military, however. As many militia soldiers were fighting against their will, the political analyst expected the promotions of militia leaders into the government army to lead to the disintegration of the majority of the local militias. "Many of them were conscripted against their will at a young age - they were grabbed from their houses by force," he observed. "The common fine a boys' family would have to pay when he would run away was 10 cows." The SPLM/A, who opened an office in Malakal on 17 February, had a more skeptical view and feared that the promotions would jeopardise the peace. "The problem is not the leaders, the problem is the arms," Anthony Edward Nwyawelo, chairman of the SPLM/A office in Malakal, told IRIN on 23 February. "If you take away the leaders, the ordinary soldiers will remain a threat to the peace," he added. "They will pick their own leaders from amongst themselves and the fighting will continue." The 9 January Comprehensive Peace Agreement provides for a six-month pre-interim period, during which, a new constitution would be drafted and a transitional government set up. After a transitional period of six years, a referendum on southern independence is scheduled to follow. "The pre-interim period is a real challenge for all of us," Nwyawelo said. "What is done during these six months will reflect what is going to be effected during the next 6 years of the transitional period." "The security protocol [of the peace agreement] groups the armies into two sides; each side has to control its militias," Steven Mummiedo, deputy secretary-general of the SPLM/A in Malakal told IRIN on 23 February. "What we are seeing now in Upper Nile is that certain groups are trying to book their positions ahead of the consolidation of the peace on the ground." Loth Jok, the UDF chairman, said he expected the fighting would continue during the pre-interim period, but would stop with the arrival of UN-peacekeepers. "The government fears the international community and does not want to be blamed for disrupting the peace agreement by continuing to support the militias," he said. Amum was more sceptical regarding the threat the militias posed to the peace. "The UN peacekeeping forces are very, very important," he said. "It is the only way to save the situation and to show people that something very important is happening on the ground. Without their presence the situation will deteriorate." Pal, the government's HAC deputy-commissioner, did not share Amum's view, however. "The fighting started when there was no peace," he said. "It is important that the militias are disarmed so that the robbing will stop, but the militias will not affect the peace." A Long Way to Go During the first three years of the transitional period, the SPLM/A is accorded 28 percent of the seats in the transitional central government, while other southern parties will receive only six percent. Observers worry that such imbalance could easily lead to resentment in parts of the south where the SPLM/A is viewed as being Dinka-dominated, such as large parts of Upper Nile where the Nuer are the dominant group. "The SPLM/A is looked at as heroes in Upper Nile and they have a lot of Nuer fighters among them, while the SSDF is often resented," a local analyst said. "Contrary to general opinion, during the first elections, scheduled in about three years, the SPLM/A might actually win against their political challengers in Nuer areas." Peter Kun, the chairman of the USAP in Malakal, however felt the biggest challenge was the formation of a new society in southern Sudan. "After decades of war, people are not aware of human rights and they do not know what good governance and democracy entail," he said. "They have many grievances as many crimes went unpunished and overcoming the urge for revenge is an important aspect of implementing the peace."