Interview with Samina Ahmed, head of the International Crisis Group

A political scientist by training and a researcher by profession, Dr Samina Ahmed heads the International Crisis Group's (ICG) recently established office for Pakistan and Afghanistan in Pakistan's capital, Islamabad. As a leading international non-profit, independent organisation working on conflict resolution, the ICG has contributed enormously to the understanding of issues that affects the lives of millions around the globe. In an interview with IRIN on Wednesday, Ahmed said that the international community might overlook democratisation to preserve stability in the region. "The approval of the international community has meant that international actors have overlooked domestic problems to accept repressive regimes," she said. QUESTION: In light of what has transpired since 11 September, how would you describe stability in the region now? ANSWER: September 11 has impacted the region quite directly, largely because of the presence of Osama bin Ladin and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, and of course, because of the fact that the Taliban were not willing to give him up. You have the international community involved in the region against a regime that they thought was undesirable, and to root out terrorists who are still within the region. Quite obviously this has had a major impact on South Central Asia. But Central Asia has also been the beneficiary and at the receiving end of the war against terrorism. The beneficiary, because Central Asia's importance was increased for the international community as respected states have cooperated in the coalition. Negatively, however, because unfortunately that assistance and the approval of the international community has meant that international actors have overlooked domestic problems to accept repressive regimes. In some ways that's also what happened to Pakistan, where it has been the beneficiary by receiving economic assistance, loans and grants. In some ways the political stability of Pakistan might be adversely affected by the post September 11 developments as the international community, particularly the United States, might be willing to put other issues on the back burner, which are crucial for Pakistan's stability, in particular the return to democracy. Q: What are your major concerns regarding the post loya jirga Afghanistan? A: Post loya jirga Afghanistan, also, in some ways has been influenced by the post September 11 thinking that the status quo is preferable to change. It means that the political order that was put in place after the Taliban were ousted from power would continue. There is a belief that some of these groups, personalities and individuals in power should be allowed to stay there in the name of stability. But as a result the political process is being distorted and the loya jirga demonstrated that this could have implications for long-term political stability in Afghanistan. Q: Security has been one of the major concerns in Afghanistan, what solution would you propose? A: There is no solution other than the one at the moment and that unfortunately is not a solution that the United States supports. The international community has a responsibility and an obligation to Afghanistan to provide security to the people of Afghanistan. The only way to do this is by expanding international peacekeeping forces outside Kabul. This will allow the recovery and reconstruction to proceed and would give a space to the Afghans to reconcile themselves after years and years of conflict. Unfortunately, the US sees the answer in building the Afghan national army. Of course, Afghanistan will need an army but it will take a long time before you get Afghans to accept a military that everybody feels is representative of the state. To rush that process would be to mar that process. Q: What trends do you see in Afghanistan's evolving foreign policy towards Pakistan and Iran? A: It's still a very uneven course. Partly because of the divisions in Kabul itself, partly because of the way power is distributed in Afghanistan. Ismail Khan has very cordial relations with Iran and some members of the transitional administration don't trust Iran at all. Karzai says he is reaching out to Pakistan, but there are many members of his cabinet, who are extremely suspicious of that. While there are opportunities for Afghanistan to mend its fences with its neighbours and for it's neighbours to do the same, there remains deep suspicions inside the country - with some justification - that their neighbours are more intent on using Afghanistan rather than helping it. Q: Musharraf has played a major part in the international war against terrorism, a fact, which has cost him a great deal of public support. Do you think this could eventually undermine his hold on power? A: I don't think there is any connection between Musharraf's support in the war against terrorism and his lack of popularity in Pakistan. The mainstream political parties, the Pakistan People's Party and the Pakistan Muslim League would have taken exactly the same approach. There is this direct link being made about the fact that Islamic political parties are upset about Musharraf's posture and his lack of popularity. I don't see the line as the Islamic parties themselves are not popular. They don't have the mass base to translate the issue into large-scale popular discontent. Q: Pakistan is gearing for elections in October. How you view the transition to democracy? A: This is exactly what I have been looking at to figure out where the transition to democracy is going. It seems at the moment that the transition is quite troubled. The government proposed constitutional packages that are disturbing for a very simple reason - they are undemocratic. There is a procedure to bring change in the basic law of the land, and that is only through a sovereign parliament. The other reason is that the proposed changes would change the federal parliamentary system and transform it to a presidential system with no checks and balance. Of course, these are only proposed changes, but there is a chance that these could become law through ordinances even before the elections and are given constitutional cover by the mandate given to Musharraf by the Supreme Court of Pakistan. Q: There are reports that Osama bin Ladin is hiding somewhere in Pakistan. How you view these reports? A: There are conflicting reports about him being in Pakistan or Afghanistan or being killed. There is no way to assess any of these reports until we have some evidence on the ground. There is no way of judging the credibility of these reports until we have had a firsthand eyewitness account of what happened after the bombing. What is particularly interesting is that not only Osama bin Laden disappeared into the blue, but so did [the Taliban leader] Mullah Omar. The two being so closely linked seems to me that at least there is sufficient evidence that they weren't killed in the fighting. Q: What are the ethnic dynamics of the overall political scenario in the region? A: Ethnic dynamics come from political cultures. Ethnicity itself is not a problem being an identity marker. There is no getting away from ethnic identity in South Central Asia. In Pakistan ethnicity is on regional lines and Afghanistan is no different. The problem arises when particular groups feel disadvantaged. In the case of Afghanistan, quite obviously the Pashtuns are disgruntled, unhappy and feel threatened. At this point in time, they are not up in arms against the Karzai's government - but would certainly like their due share both in Kabul and in terms of whatever flows into Afghanistan from the international community. In Pakistan, where the ethnic minorities have always felt disgruntled when there is military rule, representative government is the only way of addressing ethnic grievances.